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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 2000 through
September 30, 2001. The cases examined include decisions of
courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
There was a dramatic increase this year in the number of oil, gas, and
mineral law cases. This increase, coupled with the necessity of including
legislation of interest, has resulted in a more selective approach in choos-
ing which cases to report. Unpublished cases are not included.
II. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
John G. and Maria Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Dewhurst2 reaffirms
the general rule that the shoreline for civil-law littoral tracts is the upper
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law, decided by Texas courts but applying laws of other states, are not
included.
2. 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 268, slip op., No. 99-0667, 2000 WL 1862934 (Dec. 21, 2000).
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level of the shore as located under the methodology described in the Lut-
tes case, but finds an exception for a significant part of the shoreline of
the Laguna Madre. Luttes v. State3 holds that the shoreline of civil-law
(Spanish grant) tracts is at the mean higher high tide.4 The mean higher
high tide used to determine the littoral boundary under a civil-law grant
is a datum or plane calculated by obtaining daily water measurements
from tide gauges and then averaging all daily high tides over the full 18.6
year tidal cycle.5 Tide gauges reflect water level changes, whether pro-
duced by astronomical factors, weather conditions, or a combination of
both. 6 In the Kenedy Memorial Foundation case, the calculation began
with the data from the tide gauges, but because of the unique physical
characteristics of the disputed area, the line of mean higher high tide
could not be calculated using the usual National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) methodology.7 In fact, the NOAA re-
fused to certify tide gauges in the disputed area.8
The disputed area is part of the shoreline of the Laguna Madre. The
Laguna Madre is a body of water between the Texas coast and Padre
Island. At issue was "ownership of about 35,039 acres of coastal land
along the shore of the Laguna Madre."9
The Foundation claimed that Luttes controlled, and the Foundation
produced expert testimony as to the location of the boundary. Although
the Foundation's experts never attempted to calculate mean higher high
tide, they testified that essentially the entire Laguna Madre fell within the
grant (but the Foundation only claimed to the coastal side of the In-
tracoastal Waterway). The State contended that the correct line was
about six miles further west as surveyed by Darrell Shine. The State-
sponsored Shine survey was "based upon historical evidence substantially
contemporaneous with the grants."'10 The State contended that the Luttes
opinion permitted an exception to the methodology approved in Luttes
and that the location and unique geography made it impossible to apply
the Luttes formula."
The court agreed with the State that Luttes left open the possibility that
the civil-law shoreline could be located at a place other than the mean
higher high tide line, if the mean higher high tide line as calculated did
not accurately reflect the shoreline.1 2 The ultimate objective was to lo-
cate with reasonable accuracy "the upper level of the shore (the shore-
line) of the area regularly covered and uncovered by the sea over a long
3. 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958).
4. Id. at 191.
5. Id. at 169, 174 (citing Tidal Datum Planes, U.S. Dep't of Corn., Coast and Geod.
Survey, Special Publication No. 135, Rev. Ed. at 86 (1951)).
6. Id. at 173.
7. Kenedy Mem'l Found., 2000 WL 1862934, at *1.
8. Id. at *10.
9. Id. at *1.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. at *9.
12. Kenedy Mem'l Found., 2000 WL 1862934, at *13.
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period of time."1 3 Using historical evidence was an acceptable methodol-
ogy before Luttes, and the court held that using historical evidence was
appropriate when the NOAA methodology required by Luttes could not
be calculated and the location of the shoreline had not changed from the
original grant.14 The Shine survey was based on prior maps and surveys,
the patent, prior court cases, information from NOAA, and aerial photo-
graphs.15 The jury found and the court confirmed that the Shine survey
marked with "reasonable accuracy the line between the fast land and the
shore of the Laguna Madre."'1 6 The court reaffirmed the methodology
used in the Luttes case for civil-law seashore boundaries and limited their
holding to the facts of the Kenedy Mem'l Found. case.17
Reagan v. Marathon Oil Company18 reaffirms that a conveyance of
minerals in a tract adjacent to a highway will presumptively convey min-
erals to the center of the highway under the doctrine of "strips and
gores." It is settled under that doctrine:
[A] conveyance of land bounded on a public highway carries with it
the fee to the center of the road as part and parcel of the grant. Such
is the legal construction of the grant unless the inference that it was
so intended is rebutted by the express terms of the grant.19
The language used in the deeds reviewed in this case, which referred to
the "north line" of the road and along the "south line" of the road, were
found insufficient to "rebut the presumption that a deed conveying prop-
erty adjoining a public highway carries with it title to the center of the
road. "20
Senn v. Texaco, Inc.21 holds that purchasers of the surface estate have
no standing to sue for a permanent nuisance claim that accrued to the
prior owner of the land. Senn purchased the surface of the Covered "S"
Ranch in 1997.22 Senn sued former and current operators for permanent
and temporary injury to his land from contamination of the aquifer un-
derlying the land. This appeal resulted from a summary judgment dis-
missing the claim as to the former operators for lack of standing.2 3 It was
undisputed that the drilling and production activities of Texaco et al.
ceased before the land was conveyed to Senn. The court followed the
well-established rule in Texas that:
Where injury to land results from a thing that the law regards as a
permanent nuisance, the right of action for all the damages resulting
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *15.
16. Id. at *16.
17. Kenedy Mem'l Found., 2000 WL 1862934, at *16.
18. 50 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. App,-Waco 2001, no pet.).
19. Id. at 77 (quoting State v. Williams, 335 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1960) and other
authorities).
20. Id. at 80.
21. 55 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Eastland, pet. denied).




from the injury accrues to the owner of the land at the time the thing
that causes the injury commences to affect the land. Stated another
way, a cause of action for injury to real property is a personal right
which belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of
the injury. The right to sue for injury to the land is not a right that
runs with the land.24
Senn argued that by application of the discovery rule, Senn, not Senn's
assignor, owned the cause of action, because Senn discovered the injury
to the aquifer. The court refused to find that the discovery rule could
work to transfer ownership of a cause of action.25 The court refused to
alter the existing "bright line" rule for determining ownership of the
cause of action. The conveyance to Senn was without warranty, except as
to title, and Senn's claim that his vendor had conveyed the vendor's rights
against Texaco et al. to Senn was summarily dismissed.26
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. LEASE TERMINATION
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool27 is the first of several
lease termination cases out of the Amarillo court. The Texas Panhandle
has spawned a cottage industry based on the difficulty inherent in defeat-
ing lease termination claims that are twenty or thirty years old. Railroad
Commission records are used as the original source to identify periods of
no production, then the impossible burden shifts to the operator to come
up with an explanation for the cessation of production. Because the peti-
tion for review has been granted in this and several of the other cases
reported below, it is likely that there will soon be a significant opinion on
lease termination from the Texas Supreme Court.
In Pool, the cessation of production occurred at least 29 years prior to
the filing of suit, although the lessee continued to produce two wells on
the lease and even drilled a third well on the lease in 1996.28 Pool sued
for lease termination, trespass and conversion. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment on lease termination. Pool's proof was Rail-
road Commission Production records on the two known wells showing
three time intervals in which both wells failed to produce. Although Pool
failed to negate the possibility that there may have been other wells, the
court rejected that possibility as mere speculation.29
The lease had no savings clauses, and Natural Gas Pipeline Company
of America (NGPL) sought to invoke the temporary cessation doctrine.
The court held that Pool was not required to produce any evidence on
24. Id. at 225 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (citing Vann v. Bowie Sewer-
age Co., 90 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1936)); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd. n.r.e.).
25. Senn, 55 S.W.3d at 226.
26. Id.
27. 30 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. granted).
28. Id. at 624-25.
29. Id. at 625.
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whether the lease was producing in paying quantities, because the evi-
dence established that there was no production at all. Furthermore, the
burden was upon the lessee NGPL to prove that the cessation of produc-
tion fell within the temporary cessation doctrine. NGPL's only proof was
a generic affidavit from the employee who was the Area Superintendent
of Gas Measurement for NGPL from 1958-86. Although he testified to
NGPL's general policies and procedures, he did not testify as to any spe-
cific facts on these specific wells or as to the time intervals in which no
production was shown by Railroad Commission records. The court found
that this was not enough to create a fact issue and affirmed the partial
summary judgment on termination.30
The case went to trial on the remaining issues, including NGPL's af-
firmative defenses. NGPL lost with the jury on laches, and the court
overruled NGPL's point on laches, notwithstanding the obvious difficul-
ties for NGPL in producing witnesses and documents after 29 years. The
court, citing Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises,31 held that "[liaches is not a
defense in a trespass to try title suit where the plaintiff's right is based on
legal title."' 32 Pool was not a suit in trespass to try title, but the court
extended the effect of Rogers to include suits for declaratory relief as to
title.
NGPL lost with the jury on the revivor defense, which was based on
Pool's execution of division orders over the years. The court held that
division orders can support a revivor only if the lessee has detrimentally
relied upon them. NGPL drilled a third well and there was evidence that
NGPL would not have drilled the well if it had known the lease had ter-
minated. However, there was also some evidence that NGPL did not rely
upon the division orders, which was enough to sustain the jury finding.33
NGPL lost with the jury on adverse possession. Although NGPL exer-
cised dominion and control over the acreage under lease for over sixty
years, the court found that none of that conduct was inconsistent with its
rights as lessee. "Because the original possession of the property by
[NGPL] was not only permissive, but also consistent with [Pool's] concur-
rent interest in the property, adverse possession cannot be established
unless notice of the hostile nature of the possession or repudiation of
[Pool's] title is clearly manifested. ' 34 The court found that there was no
evidence of repudiation, and further rejected NGPL's argument that if
NGPL became a trespasser upon lease termination, such possession could
not have been permissive. The court found that "entering property with-
out consent is not necessarily the same as claiming ownership of the prop-
erty by that entry. '35
30. Id. at 626-27.
31. 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).
32. Pool, 30 S.W.3d at 627 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 628.




The jury awarded damages for bad faith trespass. NGPL argued that
entry must have been permissive until Pool filed suit. The court held that
silence does not necessarily make the entry permissive, and good faith is
determined not by whether the entry was permissive, but by the belief of
the trespasser that he has "the right to enter and develop the minerals."
36
The jury awarded exemplary damages for fraud, which the court re-
versed for no evidence. There is generally no duty to disclose, and "Texas
law has not recognized a fiduciary relationship between a lessee and roy-
alty owners."' 37 There was some evidence that Pool knew about the ter-
mination, there were many sources from which he could have learned of
the termination, and there was no evidence that NGPL fraudulently mis-
represented the facts.38
The court upheld the jury finding of bad faith trespass, because there
was some evidence of bad faith.39 The award of actual damages was re-
duced to $1,049,502.56, because the court found the two-year statute of
limitations as to trespass and conversion governed the case.40 The court
concluded that the award of attorney's fees to Pool could not be sustained
under the declaratory judgment statute, because the case was "essentially
an action for trespass to try title and not for declaratory judgment. 41
However, because NGPL asserted adverse possession as a defense, the
trial court could award attorney's fees to Pool as the prevailing party in a
trespass to try title case. 42
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool4 3 is a lease termination
case out of the Amarillo court and is a companion case to the opinion
reported immediately above. The facts and the issues are substantially
the same, except that Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America
(NGPL) had more success with the jury on its affirmative defenses.
NGPL secured a favorable jury finding on adverse possession, but the
trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It was again
undisputed that NGPL had conducted operations on the lands for de-
cades, but again the court held this was not enough to put Pool on notice
that NGPL had repudiated the lease. Because the original entry by
NGPL was "not only permissive, but also consistent with [Pool's] concur-
rent interest in the property, adverse possession [could] not be estab-
lished unless notice of the hostile nature of the possession or repudiation
of [Pool's] title [was] clearly manifested. 44
NGPL secured a favorable jury finding on laches, but the trial court
entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It was again undisputed
36. Id. at 630.
37. Pool, 30 S.W.3d at 633.
38. Id. at 632-34.
39. Id. at 634-35.
40. Id. at 635 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp.
2000)).
41. Id. at 637; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997).
42. Pool, 30 S.W.3d at 637.
43. 30 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. granted).
44. Id. at 644.
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that the delay of 14 to 57 years in bringing suit made it difficult for NGPL
to find documents and witnesses, but again the court held that laches is
not a defense in a suit for declaratory judgment to clear title to an oil and
gas lease when plaintiff's right is based upon legal title. 45
The extent to which NGPL was entitled to a credit against damages for
good faith improvements presented an issue not addressed in the first
Pool case. Although the jury found good faith, the jury awarded nothing
for the credit. The court held that the measure of damages for a good
faith trespass is the "value of the minerals at the surface, less the costs of
mining, extracting and hoisting the minerals to the surface. ''46 Pool ad-
mitted that NGPL was entitled to a credit of $161,750.80 for the costs of
gathering, compression and treating, but disputed NGPL's right to a
credit for lease expenses and overhead. The court awarded an additional
$115,715.29 for lease expenses and overhead, so that the judgment for
damages was reduced by a total of $277,466.09 for the same period during
which damages were incurred. 47
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Law48 is a lease termination
case out of the Amarillo court holding that a terminated lease was re-
vived by a recorded family settlement agreement. There were two pro-
ducing wells on the Haas lease, which had been held by production since
1934. Suit was filed for lease termination and damages for conversion
approximately 36 years after the last interruption in production in 1964.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment as to lease termination
and submitted the remaining issues to the jury, including NGPL's affirm-
ative defenses. NGPL obtained favorable findings on adverse possession
and on revivor. The trial court rendered judgment notwithstanding the
verdict that the lease had terminated and awarded damages to the
lessors. 49
The court reversed and rendered on the sole question of revivor.
There was evidence that before 1979 the lessors were aware of production
issues affecting the lease.50 On December 28, 1979, the ten owners of the
mineral interests in the land signed a family settlement agreement. The
principal purpose was to clarify the various changes in ownership that had
occurred and to appoint an agent to act for the owners with respect to the
lease. The agreement identified the land and the mineral rights as "now
subject to an oil and gas lease in favor of Natural Gas Pipeline Company
of America, Lease #8070- 0 & G, known as Mary Haas #1 and #3."51
The division of interest expressed in the agreement recited that "the said
mineral rights and lease are now owned in proportions as follows. .",52
45. Id. at 645-46.
46. Id. at 651.
47. Id. at 650-51.
48. 65 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. filed).
49. Id. at 123.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 124.
52. Id. at 125
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The agreement was recorded in the deed records of Moore County.53
The court found that the agreement was a revivor of the lease.54 The
factors that it considered important were that it was a formal document,
professionally prepared; it described the land as "now subject" to the
lease; it expressly identified the lessee, the land, the wells, the lease num-
ber; and the use of the word "now" indicated the existence of the lease in
1979.55
Lessors cited the Texas division order statute for the principle that "the
execution of a division order does not revive a lease."' 56 The court re-
fused to find that the agreement was a division order as described in the
statute. Moreover, the court held that the statutory provisions could not
apply to the 1979 agreement because "the provisions were not enacted
until 1983 and do not have retroactive effect that would alter substantive
rights." 57
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson58 is another lease termination
case out of the Amarillo court. It holds that the words "as long thereafter
as gas is or can be produced"59 in the habendum clause of a lease implic-
itly means actually produced. 60 Thompson's lease to Anadarko included
a 60-day cessation of production clause, and Anadarko did not argue that
there was "no cessation of production or temporary cessation of produc-
tion. '61 Instead, Anadarko urged a literal reading of the habendum
clause, because the well was apparently always capable of producing. 62
The court rejected this argument and relied heavily upon Garcia v.
King.63 Garcia construed the words "as long thereafter as oil, gas and
other minerals is produced"64 in the habendum clause of a lease as implic-
itly meaning "in paying quantities. '65 Garcia also looked to the objec-
tives of the parties in entering into the lease and concluded that economic
benefit was one of the objectives.66 Because a literal interpretation might
allow the lessee to hold the lease merely for speculation purposes (al-
though there was apparently no evidence of that in this case), the court
concluded that "can be produced" must mean more than mere physical
ability to produce67 and held that "can be produced" means actual
53. Natural Gas Pipeline, 65 S.W.3d at 126.
54. Id. at 128.
55. Id. at 126.
56. Id. at 128 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 94.401-.402 (Vernon 1993 & Supp.
2001)).
57. Id. (citing Act of May 12,1983, 68th Leg., R.S., Ch. 228, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
966).
58. 60 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. granted).
59. Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 137-40.
61. Id. at 141 n.2.
62. Id. at 138.
63. 164 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1942).
64. Id.
65. Thompson, 60 S.W.3d at 138 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 139.
67. Id.
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production.68
Anadarko also appealed the trial court's denial of all of its affirmative
defenses. The court tested the record under the no evidence standard
and found some evidence to support the trial court as to each defense.
69
The break in production occurred twelve years before suit was filed.
70
The court rejected adverse possession as a defense because at trial
Anadarko asserted it never intended to abandon the lease, which was
some evidence that it did not repudiate the lease and some evidence that
Anadarko's claim was not hostile - both necessary elements of an adverse
possession defense.71 The defense of quasi-estoppel (lessors accepting
benefits over many years) was rejected because there was some evidence
that Thompson did not know the lease had terminated until approxi-
mately the time the suit was filed.72 Laches was rejected for the same
reason, 73 and because laches cannot be used to defeat the legal title which
automatically reverted to Thompson upon cessation of production.
74
Anadarko urged revivor based on division orders, transfer orders, deeds,
and other documents. The court rejected each of the documents
presented, because they did not expressly revive the lease in question.
There were no words of grant, the lease was never specifically identified,
and the words relied upon were simply generic to printed forms.
75
Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.76 is a lease termination case
which analyzes the temporary cessation of production doctrine and ap-
plies it in a way which is generally favorable to the lessee. The consoli-
dated lease at issue in the case was a very old form of lease and did not
contain a shut-in clause, a cessation of production clause, a force majeure
clause, or any other savings clause. 77 There were two producing wells on
the lease, and each was subject to separate marketing arrangements. The
Rockwell 1-102 was completed in 1931 in the Brown Dolomite formation,
and the gas production was subject to a long term gas contract. The
Rockwell BiR was completed in 1961 in the Red Cave formation, and the
gas production was being processed through the Turkey Creek gas
plant.78 Production from the Rockwell 1-102 ceased for nineteen months
in about 1985. The long term gas contract expired, negotiations began
over the terms of a renewal, negotiations broke down, litigation resulted,
and eventually production resumed.79 Production from the Rockwell
B1R held the lease during this nineteen month interruption, except that
68. Id. at 140.
69. Id. at 141-45.
70. Thompson, 60 S.W.3d at 141.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 141-42.
75. Thompson, 60 S.W.3d at 142-45.
76. 46 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet. h.).
77. Id. at 311, 319.
78. Id. at 311-12.
79. Id. at 312.
20021 1227
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Rockwell BIR was itself shut-in for 92 days, and again for 61 days,
during the same term. Both of these interruptions were attributable to
mechanical work at the Turkey Creek Plant.80
With no savings clause, the lease would terminate immediately upon
the cessation of production, except for the operation of the implied tem-
porary cessation of production clause. The operation of that clause has
been summarized as follows in the leading Texas case of Watson v.
Rochmil 81:
It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease
[under consideration], upon cessation of production after termina-
tion of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated. The
strictness of the above rule has been modified where there is only a
temporary cessation of production due to sudden stoppage of the
well or some mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in con-
nection therewith, or the like. Under such circumstances, ...the
lessee is entitled to a reasonable time in which to remedy the defect
and resume production. 82
The troublesome issue is to determine the scope of the phrase "or the
like" in defining the universe of interruptions in production which will be
excused by the implied temporary cessation of production clause.
Krabbe contended that "the cessation of production doctrine should be
limited to cessations due to causes arising prior to the point of sale of gas
from the well, or to physical or mechanical causes."'83 After reviewing the
principal Texas authorities, the court unequivocably rejected this conten-
tion.84 The court appears to have left the trial court free to consider evi-
dence of any cause resulting in an interruption in production and
evidence of any action taken to restore production. The result is to re-
direct the inquiry in a more useful direction to both the lessee's intent
and the objective evidence of the lessee's intent as manifested in lessee's
efforts to restore production. 85 In fact, the court was more concerned
with whether the lessee acted in good faith and with due diligence.86
80. Id. at 312-13.
81. 155 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1941).
82. Id. at 784 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. Krabbe, 46 S.W.3d at 318.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. at 317-18 ("In contrast to the facts in Watson, [155 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.
1941)] the record before us does not reflect that either Anadarko or Cabot intended to
cause wells that could produce gas to cease production for an indefinite length of time
because production was not economic, or for any other reason . . . . The record reflects
that during the periods of non-production in August, September and October, 1985 and
May and June 1986, Anadarko was continuing its quest to have Cabot resume accepting
gas from 1-102 under the agreement Anadarko contended was in place, and that Anadarko
had no information that Cabot's Turkey Creek plant would fail to resume accepting normal
gas quantities from B1R. Whether Anadarko acted in good faith and diligently by waiting
for the anticipated resumption of processing by the Turkey Creek Plant instead of under-
taking to re-work the Panhandle 10-inch pipeline to circumvent Cabot's Turkey Creek
Plant with gas from 1-102 during its controversy with Cabot over whether a contract ex-
isted for Cabot to take gas from 1-102 and other Brown Dolomite wells, was for the trial
court to determine from the evidence.")
86. Id. at 318.
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Krabbe also contended that due diligence required the lessee to take
action by bypassing the Turkey Creek Plant and connecting to another
transmission line. 87 As authority for Krabbe's position, it was contended
that Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid88 stands for the proposition that a "reasonable
time" for a lessee to obtain resumption of production following a tempo-
rary cessation is the time it would take to lay gathering lines to a market.
The court rejected this argument by noting that Reid was construing the
effect of a shut-in royalty clause.89 The trial court was free to consider all
the evidence before it, and "the evidence was legally and factually suffi-
cient to support the trial court's findings and conclusion that Anadarko
diligently and in good faith sought to re-establish production." 90
Finally, Krabbe contended "that both the pricing dispute and the Tur-
key Creek Plant shut downs were foreseeable, avoidable, non-physical,
marketing problems excluded from the temporary cessation of produc-
tion doctrine." 91 The court concluded that foreseeability and avoidability
are not elements of the temporary cessation doctrine. 92
In summary, it appears that the court concluded that the specific cause
of a cessation in production is not important, so long as the lessee acted in
good faith. The more relevant inquiries are whether the cessation was
temporary and whether the lessee acted with due diligence to restore pro-
duction. If the cessation is temporary, and the lessee acts in good faith
and with due diligence to restore production, then the interests of lessor
and lessee are aligned. It is then logical to imply such a temporary cessa-
tion of production clause on behalf of the parties to the lease.
Ridenour v. Herrington93 is a lease termination case holding that a
lease terminates as a matter of law when there is a total cessation of pro-
duction for six months and the lease has a sixty-day continuous opera-
tions clause. The lease expressly provided: "Cessation of paying
production after the primary term for a period of sixty days shall cause
this lease to terminate. ' 94 It was uncontroverted that production totally
ceased for six months. 95 The court held that the express lease clause pre-
cluded implying a temporary cessation of production clause for a "rea-
sonable time," and that, when there has been a complete cessation of
production, there is no inquiry into the "reasonable period of time" over
which to measure profitability or whether production is in "paying
quantities. '96
87. Id. at 314.
88. 337 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. 1960).
89. Krabbe, 46 S.W.3d at 318.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 314.
92. Id. at 319.
93. 47 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).
94. Id. at 119.
95. See id. at 122.
96. Id. at 121-22.
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Guinn Investments, Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co.97 holds that the temporary
cessation of production doctrine does not apply to continue the lease
when the lessee voluntarily ceases production or operations. Two sepa-
rate but contiguous tracts were included in a single lease in 1937. The
lessees, Guinn and Ridge, separately developed their tracts. In 1950, all
production on the Guinn tract ceased, but the entire lease was held by
production from two producing wells on the Ridge tract. In September
1997, Ridge tried to buy out Guinn, but was rebuffed. On December 1,
1997, Ridge turned off the electricity to its own wells. On January 13,
1998, Ridge wrote to the lessors explaining his intent to cease production
for ninety days and requesting new leases. Ridge did get new leases, and
on March 3, 1998, Ridge resumed production.98
Guinn filed suit for declaratory judgment that the lease had not termi-
nated. The lease apparently did not have an express continuous opera-
tions clause, and the court followed established case law in reading into
the lease an implied temporary cessation of production clause. 99
To prevent the termination of a lease under an implied temporary
cessation clause the cessation of production must be "due to sudden
stoppage of the well or some mechanical breakdown of the equip-
ment used in connection therewith, or the like," and the lessee must
remedy the problem and resume production within a "reasonable
time." 00
Although only six weeks elapsed between the shutting off of the elec-
tricity and Ridge's approach to the lessors, the court concluded that the
lease had already terminated. Because the lease had already terminated,
the court refused to consider Guinn's alleged tortious interference
claim.' 01
B. POOLING CLAUSE
Browning Oil Co., Inc. v. Luecke'0 2 holds that damages resulting from
horizontal wells drilled in violation of the lease pooling clause are limited
to royalties on the production that can be attributed with reasonable
probability to the wrongfully pooled tract. Luecke, as lessor, executed
three oil and gas leases with Browning covering three separate tracts.
The operative provisions in the leases were the same. Each included de-
tailed pooling provisions granting to lessee the right to pool, but subject
to specific limitations. 10 3 The limitations included: an obligation to ac-
count based on surface acreage contributions to the unit; a requirement
97. Guinn Investments, Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co., slip op., No. 2-00-055-CV, 2001 WL
253430 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2001, no pet.).
98. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *3 (citing Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 323 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. 1959)).
100. Guinn, 2001 WL 253430, at *3 (quoting Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784
(Tex. 1941)).
101. Guinn, 2001 WL 253430, at *6.
102. 38 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 636.
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that a unit well drilled on the leasehold must include at least 60% of the
unit acreage from the Luecke lease; an alternate requirement that if the
unit was too large for the covered tract to equal 60%, then the unit must
be filled out with other Luecke land; another requirement that non-
Luecke land could be included only to satisfy Railroad Commission field
rules; and a final requirement that only the minimum size units permitted
by the Railroad Commission were permitted by the lease.10 4 The leases
were silent as to any distinction between vertical or horizontal wells.
Luecke rejected a proposed lease amendment that would have expressly
addressed the issues raised by a horizontal well.105
Browning drilled and completed the Medusa #1 as a horizontal well
that crossed seven tracts, including Luecke's tract two. The vertical por-
tion of the well and a part of the horizontal drainhole were on Luecke's
tract two. Browning drilled and completed the Weyand-Hays #1 as a hor-
izontal well that crossed Luecke's tract one and tract three, but the verti-
cal portion of the well was located on non-Luecke land. Each well was
purportedly pooled in a unit that clearly did not conform to the pooling
limitations in the Luecke leases.' 0 6
The trial court determined that the poolings breached the pooling pro-
visions in the Luecke leases, and that decision was affirmed.'0 7 The vari-
ous anti-dilution provisions in the pooling clause were held to be equally
applicable to horizontal wells.'0 8 In summary, the lessee was bound by
the limitations in the leases and could not pool beyond the authority ex-
pressed in the leases.109
The trial court submitted the question of damages to the jury. Based
on the jury's verdict, the trial court awarded Luecke $833,256, plus pre-
and post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees.' 10 Luecke claimed that
lessors were entitled to royalty on all production from the two purport-
edly pooled units. Furthermore, because the Weyand-Hays #1 crossed
two separate tracts of Luecke's land, Luecke argued that the lessor was
entitled to a double full royalty for the total production from that well, or
a total of $1,283,242."1 Browning presented expert testimony that the
royalty payable on the production actually attributable to the Luecke
land was $202,421, or less than the Luecke share of the pooled units, if
Luecke had ratified the units." 2 The principal issue on appeal was the
proper measure of damages.
Under the Texas rule of capture, a landowner owns all the oil and gas
produced by a well drilled on the landowner's land. The landowner may
104. Id. at 637-38.
105. Id. at 638.
106. See id. at 638, 640.
107. Browning, 38 S.W.3d at 642.
108. Id. at 640.
109. Id. at 641-42.
110. Id. at 632.
111. Id. at 639.
112. Browning, 38 S.W.3d at 639.
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produce whatever flows from that well, even if the oil and gas may have
migrated from a neighboring tract. The neighboring landowner's only re-
course is to drill his own well to capture whatever he can from his well.'
13
Pooling results in a cross-conveyance of interests in land by agreement, so
that each landowner obtains an undivided joint ownership in the royalty
earned from the land in the pooled unit. Pooling abrogates the rule of
capture, but a "lessee's authority to pool is derived solely from the terms
of the lease," and "a lessee has no power to pool absent this express
authority.''114
The court found that because Luecke was not validly pooled, Luecke
was not entitled to any royalties on oil and gas produced from unit lands
not owned by Luecke. t 15 Under the rule of capture, a vertical well may
drain oil or gas from adjacent property, but the production will be treated
as if it all were produced from the wellsite tract. Although the court rec-
ognized that lessees should not be allowed to ignore lease provisions and
exceed their pooling authority with impunity, on public policy grounds
the court held:
We decline to apply legal principles appropriate to vertical wells that
are so blatantly inappropriate to horizontal wells and would discour-
age the use of this promising technology. The better remedy is to
allow the offended lessors to recover royalties as specified in the
lease, compelling a determination of what production can be attrib-
uted to their tracts with reasonable probability .... The Lueckes are
entitled to the royalties for which they contracted, no more and no
less. 116
The court remanded on damages, but in a footnote" 7 acknowledged
that Luecke might expand the remedies claimed on remand. The case
before the court had been limited by Luecke's own claim that the only
damages sought were those based on the royalties due under the lease.
Presumably this leaves the door open for damages in tort, including the
possibility of exemplary damages.
Freeman v. Samedan Oil Corp." 8 holds that a common lease pooling
clause may not be extended or construed to include the authority to unit-
ize the lease acreage into a large waterflood unit. The twenty-five acre
Freeman Lease covering an undivided 1/10 mineral interest was granted
on June 28, 1966. On July 15, 1966, a producing oil well was completed
on the duly formed Price Oil Unit, which included 19.83 acres from the
Freeman Lease. The Price Oil Well was a unit well, but not a lease well.
In early 1967, the lessee sought agreement from Freeman for a much
wider secondary recovery unit. Freeman refused. The waterflood was
113. See id. at 633.
114. Browning, 38 S.W.3d at 634 (citing Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997
S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999)); Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1965).
115. Browning, 38 S.W.3d at 643.
116. Id. at 647 (internal citation omitted).
117. Id. at n.30.
118. Freeman v. Samedan Oil Corp., slip op., No. 2-00-055-CV, 2000 WL 33279603
(Tex. App.-Tyler Apr. 18, 2001, no pet.).
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nevertheless put in place, and on September 1, 1967, the Price Oil Well
was converted into the primary water injection well for the project. The
Price Oil Well did not produce oil after September 1, 1967. In 1986, the
Freeman Lease was included in a 764.25-acre gas unit and a new well, the
Price Gas Well, was completed directly on the Freeman Lease. The
waterflood was abandoned in 1990. Freeman sued for declaratory judg-
ment that the Freeman Lease terminated in 1967 (sixty days after the
Price Oil Well was converted into an injection well) and for a 1/10 interest
in the Price Gas Well. 119
The Freeman Lease pooling clause was a common form of pooling
clause authorizing pooled units for oil up to 40 acres and for gas up to 640
acres, plus a tolerance of 10%.120 The court refused to imply the author-
ity to form a waterflood unit from this common clause based on the plain
meaning of the pooling clause,' 2 ' the Railroad Commission order on the
Waterflood Unitization Agreement (which expressly stated that it would
not bind interest owners who did not execute the agreement), 122 and stat-
utory limits on the authority of the Railroad Commission to modify the
contractual rights expressed in the lease. 123
Samedan raised the affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, and
waiver, but the court summarily dismissed them by citing to those cases
which hold that revivor does not apply in lease termination cases.1 24
There is no discussion of those cases which have found a revivor of a
terminated lease.
MCEN 1996 Partnership v. GlasselI' 25 holds that the right to partition
may be waived by executing a designation of unit. The opinion consid-
ered seven gas units, each created by a separate document.1 26 The opin-
ion loosely uses the terms "unitized," "pooling agreement" and
"designation of unit," but it appears that the operative document as to at
least some of the units may have been only a designation of unit.127 In
any event, the court analyzes the documents (pooling agreement? unitiza-
tion agreement? designation of unit?) without making any distinction as
to the type of document in its analysis.
The court first determined that the "pooled" mineral interests were an
interest in real property and that a joint owner of an interest in real prop-
119. Id. at *1-3.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id.
123. Freeman, 2000 WL 33279603, at *7 n.8 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 101.012 (Vernon 1993) providing that "[a]greements for pooled units and cooperative
facilities do not bind a landowner, royalty owner, lessor, lessee, overriding royalty owner,
or any other person who does not execute them. The agreements bind only the persons
who execute them .... No person shall be compelled or required to enter into such an
agreement.").
124. Freeman, 2000 WL 33279603, at *9-10.
125. 42 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
126. Id. at 263.
127. See id. at 263-64.
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erty may compel partition.128 However, parties can agree to waive the
right to partition, and the court found a waiver in the language used in
each pooling document. Three of the agreements included language that
the unit would continue for as long as the pooled mineral was pro-
duced. 129 Two of the designations included language that the unit would
continue for so long as a well was located on the pooled area capable of
producing. 30 Two of the designations included language (very common
in a typical designation of unit) that the leases were pooled in accordance
with their terms.' 3 ' The court found a waiver of the right to partition in
each agreement/designation for the term specified in the agreement/des-
ignation. The last form construed had no express term for the duration of
the unit, but the court nevertheless construed the designation as an agree-
ment to maintain the unit as a whole while the underlying leases were in
effect. 32
The opinion does not mention any applicable operating agreement in
its analysis of waiver. Typical form operating agreements contain express
waivers of the right to partition and also contain a maintenance of uni-
form interest provision. These common provisions ordinarily preclude
any attempt to partition oil and gas properties subject to an operating
agreement, which would include most producing properties. In passing,
the court notes that in the trial court it was alleged that the operating
agreements contained a waiver, but the court then inexplicably fails to
address what must have been an express waiver. 133
C. ROYALTY CLAUSE
In re Tri-Union Development Corp. 134 holds that Texas royalty owners
are secured parties under U.C.C. § 9.319, so that a Chapter 11 Debtor is
authorized to pay the pre-petition royalties (before the proposal and con-
firmation of the plan of reorganization) from cash collateral that the
Debtor was statutorily required to segregate for the benefit of royalty
owners. The Debtor operated oil and gas wells in several states, including
Texas. Unpaid pre-petition royalties included checks which had not been
cashed and checks which were in process at the time of the filing.135 The
Texas version of the U.C.C. includes a non-standard § 9.319 which pro-
vides for: "a security interest in favor of interest owners (as secured par-
ties) to secure the obligations of the first purchaser of oil and gas
production (as debtor) to pay the purchase price."'1 36
128. Id.
129. Id. at 264.
130. Glassell, 42 S.W.3d at 264.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 265.
133. See id.
134. 253 B.R. 808 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000).
135. Id. at 810.
136. Id. at 811 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.319 (Vernon 1991)).
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The issues presented were whether the Debtor qualified as a first pur-
chaser, and if so, whether the statute covered royalty owners who are
paid money as well as those who were paid in kind. The Creditors Com-
mittee argued that the application of § 9.319 should be limited to royalty
owners who take in kind, which would exclude most of the royalty
owners.
137
The evidence showed that the Debtor received payment under 100%
division orders, so that these royalty owners represented exactly the class
of owners the statute was designed to protect.138 The court was also in-
fluenced by the 1987 amendments to the Texas U.C.C. that were specifi-
cally intended to benefit these royalty owners.139 The Debtor was
therefore a first purchaser within the meaning of the statute, and all roy-
alty owners, whether taking in kind or in funds, enjoyed the protection of
a lien in production or proceeds. 140
In the absence of a statute such as § 9.319, the breach of contract or
tort cause of action of an unpaid royalty owner would become a general
unsecured claim in the bankruptcy of an operator or oil and gas pur-
chaser.1 41 Under § 9.319, the liens of the royalty interest owners in the
production or its cash or account proceeds were perfected and enforce-
able as of the date of filing and were not susceptible to being cut off by a
bona fide purchaser under state law or under 11 U.S.C. § 545 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 142
Union Pacific Resources includes three published opinions on the same
case. The principal issue is class certification. In Union Pacific Resources
Group, Inc. v. Hankins,'143 the royalty owners were certified as a class by
the trial court. Plaintiffs sued Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc.
(UPRG) alleging breach of the implied covenant to manage and adminis-
ter the leases, failure to obtain the best current market price for the gas,
failure to pay royalties based on the true market price, unjust enrichment,
and requesting an accounting and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to
certify a class of royalty owners owning an interest in Crockett County,
whose leases were owned or operated by UPRG, and whose gas was pur-
chased by an affiliate of UPRG. Excluded from the class were those roy-
alty owners whose leases allowed affiliate transactions or index pricing
and those royalty owners already pursuing separate litigation. 44 In this
interlocutory appeal of the order certifying the class, the court abated the
appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for additions to the
record. 145
137. See In re Tri-Union, 253 B.R. at 811.
138. Id. at 812.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 811.
142. In re Tr-Union, 253 B.R. at 814.
143. 41 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
144. Id. at 287.
145. Id. at 289.
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The court acknowledged that its review was to be conducted under an
abuse of discretion standard1 46 and recognized the general requirements
for certification set forth in Rule 42147 and in Bernal.'48 Those require-
ments are generally summarized as (1) numerosity [many possible plain-
tiffs in class], (2) commonality [questions of law or fact are common to
the class], (3) typicality [representative parties have typical claims or de-
fenses], and (4) adequacy of representation [representatives will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class].149 The court remanded,
because the trial court's order did not meet the requirement set forth in
Bernal that the order of certification must indicate how the claims will
likely be tried.150
In the second opinion, Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc. v. Han-
kins,' 5a the court denied a hearing on UPRG's request for hearing on
UPRG's motion to reconsider class certification. In response to the re-
mand from the first appeal, the trial court issued an order supplementing
the class certification order, an order to supplement the record, and an
order denying UPRG's request for a hearing. The court held that the
court's orders were not subject to an interlocutory appeal. 152
In the third reported opinion, Union Pacific Res. Group, Inc. v. Han-
kins,153 the court conducted a Bernal review and affirmed the trial court's
certification of the class. The trial court certified the class as:
All individuals and entities who:
a. Own or owned royalty under leases from which gas is produced,
where
b. The leases were owned and/or operated by the Defendant Union
Pacific Resources Group and/or an affiliate of Union Pacific Re-
sources Group, and
c. The leases are located in Crockett County, Texas; and
d. The gas was purchased by Defendant Union Pacific Fuels and/or
another affiliate of Union Pacific Resources Group. 154
The class, the excluded members, and the class representatives were all
the same as in the first appeal. Additional facts noted included that
UPRG had an interest in 590 oil and gas leases, on 122 unique lease
forms, with 58 different types of royalty clauses. There are thirteen dif-
ferent gathering systems utilizing various price indexes to determine well-
head value. 155 Numerosity is not discussed in the opinion.
However, UPRG did complain that it would be deprived of the right to
146. Id. at 288.
147. Id.; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. § 42.
148. Hankins, 41 S.W.3d at 288-89 (citing Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 22
S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000)).
149. Hankins, 41 S.W.3d at 288.
150. Id. at 289.
151. 51 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
152. Id. at 740.
153. 51 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet. h.).
154. Id. at 747.
155. ld.
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develop and present its defenses and variant facts to a jury.1 56 The court
held that UPRG had waived its position, but even if it had not, UPRG
would have the opportunity to show in response to individual claims that
a particular member was paid the correct amount. 157 It is unclear how
that is supposed to be accomplished. The court refused to directly con-
sider Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc.,158 because it considered the application
of Yzaguirre to be an issue on the merits. However, if Yzaguirre means
that individual leases must be examined to determine if there is an im-
plied covenant, then there are possibly 590 (or at least 122) reasons why
there is no commonality or typicality in this class.
In discussing commonality, the court concludes that UPRG's conduct,
its transactions with affiliates, and the resulting diminishment of royalties
all supply the element of commonality. The court assumes the issue of
whether UPRG breached the covenant to market would apply equally
and seems to generally ignore the effect of Yzaguirre.t 59
On typicality, UPRG argued that the class representatives' royalty pro-
visions were not typical as to many other royalty owners and that there
were defenses applicable to the class representatives that were not appli-
cable to other class members. The court rejected these arguments and
found sufficient typicality based on the common issues of underpayment
and breach of the (assumed) implied covenant to market. 160
UPRG challenged on adequacy of representation by raising conflicts of
interest. UPRG contended that the differing royalty clauses would create
conflicts requiring class counsel to pursue legal theories that would ad-
vance some class members' interest at the expense of other class mem-
bers. The court concluded that the right to complain of this form of
conflict belonged to class counsel's clients as an ethical issue, rather than
an appellate issue.161
The court also considered the predominance requirement under Rule
42. The test is "whether common or individual issues will be the object of
most of the efforts of the litigants and the court.' 162 The court concluded
that the trial court had conducted the "rigorous analysis" required by
Bernal and that the trial court had appropriately understood the claims,
defenses, relevant facts, applicable substantive law, and considered the
evidence in determining to certify the class.163
Class certification is a particularly hot topic for litigators, but also for
oil and gas lawyers, because many of the current cases are oil and gas
cases. Issues that oil and gas practitioners face are perhaps more likely
156. Id. at 749-50.
157. Id. at 750.
158, 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001) (holding market value lease payments may be calculated
on an amount less than the amount actually received by lessee) [reported in this Article].
159. See Hankins, 51 S.W.3d at 751.
160. Id. at 752.
161. Id. at 753.
162. Id. (quoting Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 434).
163. Hankins, 51 S.W.3d at 753-54.
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than others to end up in someone's class action because there are fre-
quently many parties involved with relatively common issues. At press
time, the action in the courts was intense. 164
D. MISCELLANEOUS
Edwards v. Guy165 holds that when title to an oil and gas lease is taken
in the name of someone other than the party who advances the purchase
price, a resulting trust is created in favor of the actual purchaser. Ed-
wards purchased a lease in 1973 in the name of an entity he controlled on
behalf of his investors, Guy and Weil and others. Edwards circulated a
joint operating agreement (JOA) to all of the working interest owners.
Because they objected to the risk penalty provisions, Guy and Weil re-
fused to sign. The other working interest owners drilled a producing well.
Guy and Weil never received anything, although the well reached payout,
even with the risk penalty included. Edwards misrepresented to Guy and
Weil that the lease had terminated and that a new lease had been ob-
tained by another of Edwards' companies and that the successful well had
been drilled by the second company. Edwards sold the 1973 lease to an-
other party, and Guy and Weil sued Edwards for damages.166
Edwards claimed that he did not commit fraud, because Guy and Weil
could not produce an assignment that would satisfy the statute of
frauds.167 His contention was that any representation made by him to
Guy and Weil was irrelevant because they owned no interest in the 1973
lease.168 There was no written agreement that Edwards' company held
title as trustee for Guy and Weil, but there was extensive evidence that
Guy and Weil owned the interest they claimed. The court rejected Ed-
wards' claim and held that when a property is taken in the name of some-
one other than the person who advances the purchase price, a resulting
trust is created, and a resulting trust is not subject to the statute of
frauds. 169
Edwards also contended that the injury complained of resulted from
the failure of Guy and Weil to sign the JOA, not his alleged misrepresen-
tation. The court held:
164. See e.g., Wagner & Brown v. Horwood, 53 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2001) (dissenting vig-
orously against the court's refusal to grant review in an oil and gas class certification appeal
when the appellate courts are clearly in conflict on certification issues); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, No. 14-00-01184-CV, 2001 WL 1249995, at *5 n.6 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2001, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (distinguish-
ing Hankins, 51 S.W.3d 741, specifically because the court failed to separate market value
owners and proceeds owners which the court found compelling on the issue of typicality);
Union Pacific Res. Group, Inc. v. Neinast, 67 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (expressly refusing to follow Hankins because it does not consider
Yzaguirre).
165. No. 01-99-00191-CV, 2000 WL 1538506 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 19,
2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
166. Id. at *1.
167. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987)).
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *3.
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A JOA is a management contract; it does not affect the ownership
interest an individual has in an oil and gas lease (recognizing a JOA
is a contract, and that when an individual chooses not to execute a
JOA, they do not lose their interest in the lease; however, they do
not get to participate in the proceeds from a productive well until the
costs and a penalty are recovered by those choosing to participate in
the JOA). 170
IV. SEISMIC
Encina Partnership v. COREnergy, L.L.C.171 is one of the very few re-
ported cases construing the common practice of utilizing bank drafts to
close on leasing and seismic permit transactions. Encina holds that the
common provision in a draft making payment on the seismic permit sub-
ject to approval within a specified time is a condition precedent to the
formation of a contract. 172
COREnergy employed a landman to obtain seismic permits in an area
which COREnergy believed to be prospective for oil and gas. The
landman obtained a seismic permit from a 1/8 mineral interest owner in
the Encina Ranch (which included 4,272 acres) at forty-five dollars an
acre, for a total of $192,240.173 Although the opinion does not explain,
this is such a large payment for a 1/8 interest that it is possible the
landman failed to proportionately reduce the payment.
The bank draft provided "[o]n approval of seismic permit or lease de-
scribed hereon and on approval of title to same by drawee not later than
3 days after the arrival of this draft at collecting bank."'1 74 COREnergy
timely dishonored the draft. The Encina case involved a seismic permit,
but the court relied heavily on a similar case involving a lease. In Sun
Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Benton,175 the Texas Supreme Court con-
strued a provision on Sun's bank draft reading "15 days after sight and
upon approval of title." The Sun Exploration court held that this lan-
guage constituted a condition precedent to Sun's liability on the draft. 176
The Supreme Court held:
A contemporaneously exchanged draft and deed must be construed
together. Here, the language on the face of the draft made Sun's
approval of title a condition precedent to formation of the contract.
Where the grantee imposes certain conditions precedent to accept-
ance, title does not pass under the deed until fulfillment of such con-
ditions. The draft effectively protected Sun against paying for the
property if it disapproved the title.177
170. Edwards, 2000 WL 1538506, at *5 (citing Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89,
100-11 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied)).
171. 50 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
172. Id. at 69.
173. Id. at 67.
174. Id. at 69.
175. 728 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1987).




The Encina court found the Sun Exploration case to be controlling,
even though the condition upon which the draft was dishonored was not
title, because COREnergy simply refused to approve the permit, and
even though the document subject to the draft was not a lease, but a
seismic permit.178
V. OPERATING AGREEMENTS
Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc.179 considers the change
of operator and nonconsent provisions of a joint operating agreement
(JOA). Kachina, as operator, proposed an acid workover with a support-
ing authorization for expenditure (AFE). Stable, the owner of a 33%
interest, consented. Approximately 28% of the owners went non-con-
sent.180 Article VI.B.2 of the JOA provided:
Upon commencement of operations for the ... reworking. . of any
such well by Consenting Parties... each Non-Consenting Party shall
be deemed to have relinquished to Consenting Parties... all of such
Non-Consenting Party's interest in the well and share of production
therefrom.'81
Stable sent Kachina a check for the share of the workover costs attribu-
table to the non-consenting owners. However, Stable and Kachina were
in a dispute regarding operation of the well and Stable's past due joint
interest billings. Kachina escrowed Stable's check. Stable claimed it was
the operator and would take control of the well. Stable's affiliate,
Anchor Operating Company, cut the locks from the gate, took possession
of the well, and for several weeks conducted an acid workover. Kachina
withdrew its AFE.182
The JOA change-of-operator provision required that the new operator
must have an interest and must be selected by majority vote. Stable con-
tended that it became the majority owner when it transferred the funds to
Kachina for the 28% non-consent interest. The court rejected this argu-
ment and held that under the JOA, the transfer of those interests could
have occurred only upon the "commencement of operations" as to the
project proposed by Kachina. Kachina withdrew the AFE on that
project. 18 3
Stable argued that the project began when Anchor seized the well and
started the acid workover. The court reasoned that this could be true
only if "(1) the operations performed were the same as those described in
the AFE, and (2) the operations were performed by a duly elected opera-
tor.' 1 84 The court found that the operation proposed and the operation
performed were not the same and rejected Stable's argument that the
178. Encina P'ship, 50 S.W.3d at 69.
179. 52 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
180. Id. at 330.
181. Id. at 332.
182. Id. at 330.
183. Id. at 332.
184. Stable Energy, 52 S.W.3d at 332.
1240 [Vol. 55
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
work performed need be only substantially similar to Kachina's propo-
sal.18 5 The court also held that Stable and Anchor together could not
constitute a majority without the acquisition of the non-consent interests,
and that could not possibly have occurred before operations commenced.
Therefore, the purposed election of Anchor was ineffective. 186 Because
the operations as proposed and as performed were substantially different,
and because the operations were not conducted by the operator, the non-
consent interests were never relinquished and could not have been ac-
quired by Stable. 187 Finally, the court also denied Stable's claim for reim-
bursement of the workover costs. The court held that the JOA provides
for reimbursement only to the operator. 88
VI. DRILLING CONTRACTS
Wil-Roye Investment Co. H v. Alleder, Inc. 189 holds a drilling contractor
liable for damage to the well attributable to the contractor's own negli-
gence and refuses to find that the operator assumed the risk of loss of
circulation attributable to the contractor's own negligence. The driller
sued for unpaid invoices, and the operator defended based on offset for
damages suffered by the operator and attributable to the driller's negli-
gence.' 90 Paragraph 12.3 of the drilling contract contained an express
provision that the operator assumed the risk of loss in the event of loss of
circulation.' 91 Paragraph 18.6 provided:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 12 and 15 hereof should a
fire or blowout occur or should the hole for any cause attributable to
Contractor's operations be lost or damaged while Contractor is en-
gaged in the performance of work hereunder on a footage basis, all
such loss of or damage to the hole shall be borne by Contractor.192
The evidence showed that the driller stopped the pipe during a loss of
circulation and then made several mistakes in attempting to free the pipe
which had become "hydrostatically stuck."' 93 After a bench trial, the
trial court found the cause of the damage was the negligence of the
driller.194
A contractual provision limiting liability for a party's own negligence
must be conspicuous and must be expressed in specific terms.' 95 The
court found that this drilling contract had no such express or conspicuous
language that would relieve the driller in advance for the driller's own
185. Id. at 332-33.
186. Id. at 334.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 335.
189. No. 08-00-00321-CV, 2001 WL 903179 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 10, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
190. Id. at *1-2.
191. Id. at *3.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Wil-Roye Inv., 2001 WL 903179, at *2.
195. Id. at *4.
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negligence.196 The court also rejected the driller's contention that the op-
erator had expressly assumed the risk of loss of circulation, noting that
such reasoning would render paragraph 18.6 meaningless. 97 Moreover,
whether the loss was caused by loss of circulation or the driller's own
negligence was a fact question, and that question had been determined
against the driller.198
VII. GAS CONTRACTS
Aquila Southwest Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Exploration, Inc.199 holds
that a gas purchaser under a gas purchase contract is obligated to exercise
"best efforts" regarding the quantity of gas to be purchased under UCC
§ 2.306. Harmony was a small producer selling its gas to Aquila under a
fairly typical arrangement whereby the producer sells its gas at the well-
head to the purchaser, and the purchaser then gathers and processes the
gas to extract the liquids. The purchaser then accounts to the producer
on the basis of a percentage of the proceeds from the liquids, plus the sale
of the residue gas at the tailgate of the plant.200 Until 1992, the plant was
running at or near 90-95% efficiency and recovering over 90% of all cas-
inghead liquids.
Aquila then began aggressively adding reserves to the system, so that
the plant capacity was overwhelmed. Aquila used the emergency bypass
line to bypass the plant. As much as 50% of the gas it received was not
processed at the plant.201 Aquila used the bypass line for at least two
years while Aquila was adding even more volume on the system.
202
By contract, Harmony was obligated to deliver 100% of its production
to Aquila. Aquila's obligation to take was limited by Sections 5.2 and 5.5
of the contract, which provided:
5.2 ... The parties expressly recognize that Buyer's obligations to
take pursuant to the rules or otherwise shall be subject to the ability
of Buyer's facilities to handle all gas connected thereto, lessening or
fluctuating demand for gas on Buyer's or its resale purchaser's sys-
tem, the location on Buyer's or its resale purchaser's system of gas
supplies and demand, and any other valid reason such as force
majeure, whether or not of a kind herein mentioned.
5.5 In the event any of Buyer's facilities are of insufficient capacity
to handle all of the gas connected thereto, Buyer shall be obligated





199. 48 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
200. See id. at 231.
201. Id. at 237.
202. Id. at 238.
203. Id. at 231-32.
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Harmony obtained a favorable jury verdict in response to the special
issue: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Aquila did
not use its best efforts to process Harmony's gas from the Harmony
Wells?" 204
Aquila is another in a series of gas contract cases in which the applica-
tion of the "best efforts" requirement in UCC § 2.306 has been an issue.
Section 2.306(b) provides:
A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive
dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise
agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the
goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.20 5
Aquila is apparently the first reported decision imposing the "best ef-
forts" requirement on the purchaser. In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Co-
noco, Inc.,206 the Texas Supreme Court considered a group of contracts in
which Northern agreed to supply gas for Conoco to process. The "best
efforts" provision was held to be inapplicable in this processing-contract
only case.207 In Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,208
the Texas Supreme Court held that the "best efforts" gap-filler quantity
provision was inapplicable to a take-or-pay contract because the quantity
term (85% of deliverability) in that case was expressly provided in the
contract.209
The Aquila court found that § 2.306(b) "permits the quantity term in
an exclusive dealing contract to be measured in terms of 'best efforts,"' 210
and that "parties in an exclusive dealing contracts are bound to use rea-
sonable diligence as well as good faith in their performance of the con-
tract.211 Because the Harmony/Aquila contract assigned the exclusive
right to process Harmony's gas to Aquila, and the parties did not agree in
the contract to modify or waive the best efforts provision of § 2.306(b),
that provision applies to the contract. 212
Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc.213 is a gas processing case with addi-
tional issues related to gathering and accounting for field liquids. Defen-
dant Conoco paid a premium to purchase the Concho Valley Gas System
(gas purchase contracts, gathering system, gas processing plants, and resi-
due gas contract), because the contract price for the residue gas was, at
that time, well above the prevailing market price. Plaintiffs were produc-
ers of natural gas who were operating within the Concho Valley Gas Sys-
tem under existing gas processing contracts and arrangements for
collecting and accounting for field liquids. Conoco bought the plants and
204. Aquila, 48 S.W.3d at 232.
205. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306 (Vernon 1994).
206. 986 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1998).
207. Aquila, 48 S.W.3d at 234 (citing Northern Natural, 986 S.W.2d at 607).
208. 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1996).
209. Aquila, 48 S.W.3d at 235 (citing Lenape, 925 S.W.2d at 570-71).
210. Aquila, 48 S.W.3d at 234.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 235.
213. 52 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2000).
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contracts, terminated the old gas purchase contracts, and entered into
new gas purchase contracts with lower prices payable to the producers.
Conoco also ceased paying the gas producers for the field liquids it col-
lected. The gas producers sued for fraud in the inducement on the new
contracts and for damages for unjust enrichment on the field liquids. 214
The fraud claim was based on Conoco's misrepresentation to the produc-
ers that their gas would no longer be sold under the favorable residue gas
contract and that Conoco had enough gas from other sources to supply
the minimum take obligations under that contract.215 In fact, most of the
producers' residue gas continued to be sold under the same residue gas
contract.
216
The jury found that Conoco had committed fraud and that fraud dam-
ages amounted to $5,000,000. However, the jury also found that each
plaintiff had ratified their contract with Conoco after discovering the
fraud. The jury also found that Conoco had been unjustly enriched by
almost $900,000 when it failed to include field liquids in the payments to
the plaintiff producers. Judgment was rendered for the unjust enrichment,
but nothing for the fraud.217
The court discussed at length whether the ratification of a contract in-
duced by fraud precluded the right to sue for damages.218 The court rec-
ognized that there may be circumstances under which a party who was
induced to enter a contract by fraud may ratify that contract in such a
manner that a claim for damages is foreclosed. The court found in this
case that the ratification by the producers who continued to sell to Co-
noco without a written contract precluded a suit for damages, but the
ratification by the producers who continued to sell to Conoco under their
new written contract did not preclude a suit for damages.21 9 The plaintiff
producers selling without written contracts delivered their gas and ac-
cepted payment. There was no requirement upon them to sell, nor upon
Conoco to purchase. As to those producers without written contracts
who continued their deliveries to Conoco after learning of Conoco's mis-
representation, delivering and accepting goods with knowledge that they
are offered at a certain price indicates a promise to pay and an agreement
to accept that price.220 The limited acts of the producers selling under the
new written contracts did not, as a matter of law, foreclose their right to
sue for fraud damages. 22' There was apparently a merger clause in the
written contracts, but because Conoco failed to assert that argument in
the trial court, the issue was not preserved on appeal. 222
214. Id. at 674-75.
215. Id. at 674.
216. Id. at 675.
217. Id.
218. Fortune Prod, 52 S.W.3d at 676-79.
219. Id. at 676.
220. Id. at 680 (citing 2 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 6:42 at 446 (R.
Lord ed., 4th ed. 1991)).
221. Fortune Prod., 52 S.W.3d at 679.
222. See id. at 681.
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The second major issue in the case was the measure of damages for
Conoco's fraud. Fraud damages were submitted to the jury based on a
benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages. The jury calculated damages
as if the producers could have negotiated a price based entirely on the
residue gas contract, rather than on the spot market. The court con-
cluded that there was no evidence to support that measure of damages,
although there was some evidence that a part (perhaps 10%) of the pro-
duction could have been sold on the basis of a price tied to the residue
gas contract. The court remanded on damages for fraud.223
Under the written contracts, Conoco took title to the entire gas stream
at a point upstream of the point where the field liquids or condensate
were taken out of the gas stream. Plaintiffs initially sought to recover
under a theory of conversion, but after a directed verdict against them,
the trial court permitted an amendment to the petition to assert that Co-
noco had been unjustly enriched. Conoco raised as an affirmative de-
fense the express contract governing the subject matter of the dispute,
which would preclude a recovery in equity for unjust enrichment. 22 4 Co-
noco did not submit an issue to secure a finding that an express contract
existed covering the subject matter of the dispute. The court found that
such a submission was not necessary as to the claims raised by the plain-
tiff producers selling their gas under written contracts because those con-
tracts were in evidence and unambiguous. 225 The plaintiff producers
selling under written contracts could not recover under a theory of unjust
enrichment. However, as to those parties selling to Conoco without a
written contract, Conoco failed to establish its defense by failing to sub-
mit the defensive issue. 226 The judgment for unjust enrichment damages
on the field liquids was reversed and rendered as to the producers with
written contracts, affirmed as to one producer with no written contract,
and remanded as to another producer who had a written contract part of
the time and no written contract part of the time.227
Redman Energy Corp. v. Koch Midstream Services Co. 228 holds that a
gas processor's "economic out" clause extended to and included the eco-
nomics of replacing a gathering line from the well to the plant. The gas
processing contract required the processor to take possession of the gas at
the delivery point (the wellhead), gather the gas to the plant, and return
the processed gas to the producer at the tailgate of the plant.229 The con-
tract specifically required the processor to construct the necessary gather-
ing lines. 230 The gathering line in question failed, and the processor
invoked the economic out clause, which provided:
223. Id. at 681-82.
224. Id. at 683.
225. Id.
226. Fortune Prod., 52 S.W.3d at 685.
227. Id.
228. 45 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).




In the event Gas from the lease as described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto is or becomes insufficient in volume or liquefiable hydrocar-
bon content, or becomes uneconomical for processing, then Proces-
sor reserves the right to submit to Producer an alternate processing
proposal. 231
The producer contended that for this clause to be triggered, the act of
processing itself must become costly without reference to the act of gath-
ering.232 In addition, the producer contended that there must be some
change in the gas itself in order to invoke this clause because the proces-
sor should have anticipated the costs of maintaining the pipeline.233 The
court rejected the producer's argument, and, from a "four corners" analy-
sis of the gas processing contract, concluded that the contract did not
treat gathering and processing as separate acts; but rather, the gathering
was an integral part of the processing of the gas.2 34
VIII. PIPELINES
Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr,235 places an extraordinarily high value on
the condemnation of a small pipeline easement by valuing the land not
for its use as a cotton field, but for its use as a pipeline easement. There
was an existing pipeline easement in favor of Koch across the Zwahr land.
Exxon condemned a 1.01 acre tract on the Zwahr land for a pipeline
easement that overlapped the Koch easement by approximately 82%.
Zwahr continued to grow cotton on the easement. As farmland, the acre-
age condemned was worth only a few thousand dollars. Judgment was
entered for $30,000, as the fair market value of the 1.01-acre easement,
and $10,000 as the fair market value of Exxon's right to assign the
easement. 236
The critical issue in the case was the highest and best use of the prop-
erty taken. The court was persuaded to value the property for its use as a
pipeline easement because there was an existing pipeline corridor (the
Koch easement), the pipeline corridor had been in place for a long time,
Exxon's pipeline was buried entirely within the existing easement, and
Exxon's own engineer testified that Exxon preferred to lay new lines next
to existing ones.237 Although there are many factors that are considered
in determining the site for a pipeline, one of the reasons for co-locating
pipelines is to accommodate the landowners by confining all pipelines to
a small area. This case would suggest that by attempting to reduce inter-
ference with other concurrent owners and uses of the property, a pipeline
company may subject itself to damages thirty times larger than would
otherwise be imposed.
231. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 345.
233. Redman Energy, 45 S.W.3d at 344.
234. Id. at 346.
235. 35 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2000, pet. granted).
236. Id. at 708.
237. Id. at 711.
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IX. RAILROAD COMMISSION
In re Apache Corp.2 38 holds that the Texas Railroad Commission does
not have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning the abatement of
water contamination caused by oil and gas production and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction will not preclude the prosecution of a civil suit for
abatement and damages.239 The landowner, Marion, believed that
Apache's wells had contaminated two aquifers underlying his property,
which resulted in the destruction of his crops. Marion complained to the
Railroad Commission which began proceedings.2 40 Marion also filed suit
in state court alleging trespass, negligence, negligence per se, nuisance,
infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability. Marion sought to
abate the contamination and to recover damages.2 41
Apache sought to abate the state court proceeding pending the resolu-
tion of the Railroad Commission proceeding. Apache contended that the
Railroad Commission had exclusive or primary jurisdiction. By statute,
the Railroad Commission has the authority "to 'adopt and enforce rules
and orders' to prevent the pollution of surface and subsurface water. '242
Also by statute, the Railroad Commission "'is solely responsible for the
control and disposition of waste and the abatement and prevention of
pollution of surface and subsurface water resulting from ... activities
associated with the drilling, development, and production of oil or gas
.... 243 The court held that these provisions did not confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the Railroad Commission, but rather evidenced the legis-
lature's intent to avoid conflicts between state agencies. 244 In reaching its
decision, the court relied heavily upon other statutes permitting landown-
ers to immediately file and prosecute damage suits founded upon the vio-
lation of Railroad Commission rules and orders.245 The court placed
particular emphasis on Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 85.322, which
provides:
[n]one of the provisions of... chapter [8] .. ., no suit by or against
the [TRC], and no penalties imposed on or claimed against any party
violating a law, rule, or order of the [TRC] shall impair or abridge or
delay a cause of action for damages or other relief that an owner of
land ... may have or assert against any party violating any rule or
order of the [TRC] or any judgment under this chapter.246
The court also refused to abate the proceeding based on primary juris-
diction. It found that the suit fit within the well-established exception to
238. 61 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2001, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
239. Id. at 436-37.
240. Id. at 433.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 434 (quoting from TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.101 (Vernon 1993)).
243. In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting from TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 26.131(a) (Vernon 2000)).
244. In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d at 435.
245. Id. at 435-36 (quoting from TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.321-322, 91.003(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2001)).
246. In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d at 435 (alterations in original).
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primary jurisdiction, specifically, "actions or disputes which are inher-
ently judicial in nature and over which the legislature has not vested ex-
clusive jurisdiction in some administrative body, may proceed. '2 47
H.G. Sledge, Inc. v. Prospective Investment and Trading Co.2 48 holds
that an overriding royalty owner on an adjoining tract is not an "affected
person" entitled to notice of hearing for a drilling permit under a Rule 37
exception. 249 Rule 37 is a Railroad Commission rule pertaining to the
spacing of wells that generally determines which drilling locations are le-
gal without further hearing. Locations which do not fit within the rule
require that an exception be granted after hearing.250
Sledge was the operator of both the drillsite tract and the offset
tract.251 The Prospective Investment and Trading Company, Ltd.
(PITCO) owned an overriding royalty on the offset tract.252 Sledge, as
the applicant for a Rule 37 exception, was required to provide the Rail-
road Commission with a list of all "affected persons" who were entitled
to receive notice of the Rule 37 application. Sledge did not notify
PITCO, and as the operator of the offset tract, Sledge waived notice to
itself.253
Under similar facts, the court had previously ruled that notice to roy-
alty owners was not required in a Rule 37 proceeding.254 The notice pro-
vision, Rule 37(a)(2)(A), identifies the persons to whom notice must be
given as including all "affected persons" within a certain distance from
the proposed well location, "including" operators, lessees of record for
tracts with no operator, and owners of unleased mineral interests.255 Al-
though this list clearly does not include overriding royalty owners, the list
is not exclusive.256 In ruling that overriding royalty owners were not in-
cluded in "affected persons," the court relied upon its prior decisions as
to royalty owners, the Commission's interpretation of its own rule, and
the rule's history.257
The court rejected PITCO's argument that there was an inherent con-
flict of interest in Sledge's position as operator of both the wellsite tract
and the offset tract and that only PITCO could properly inform the Com-
mission of the facts relevant to determining the necessity of an exception.
The court cited to a case that found that the commission does not have
the authority to adjudicate questions of title or rights of possession.2 58 In
247. Id. at 436.
248. 36 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
249. Id. at 599, 607.
250. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37 (2000).
251. H.G. Sledge, Inc., 36 S.W.3d at 599.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 600.
254. Shell Petroleum v. R.R. Comm'n, 137 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940,
no writ); Rabbit Creek Oil Co. v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 66 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1933, no writ).
255. H.G. Sledge, 36 S.W.3d at 603.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 604-06.
258. Id. at 606.
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dicta, the court stated that PITCO's proper remedy was a suit for dam-
ages, either under the instrument creating the overriding royalty or under
the farmout agreement under which Sledge claimed title.259
Occidental Permian Ltd. v. Railroad Commission260 holds that the re-
duced production tax on oil applicable to expanded enhanced recovery
projects may be lost by failure to timely obtain Railroad Commission ap-
proval. The Texas Tax Code imposes a production tax on oil,261 but
"since 1991, oil produced from an expanded enhanced recovery project
has been taxed at a significantly lower rate. '262 The lower tax rate is
applicable "provided that 'before the expansion begins, the [C]ommission
approves the expansion and designates the area to be affected by the ex-
pansion."' 263 The Railroad Commission, by enacting Statewide Rule
50,264 has established a procedure for obtaining that approval.
265
Occidental was the unit operator of a CO 2 injection flood, which began
in 1984 with plans to "inject CO2 volumes equal to [50%] of the original
hydrocarbon pore volume in the reservoir. ' 266 By 1995, Occidental con-
cluded that injecting an additional 30%, for a total of 80% of the original
hydrocarbon pore volume, would substantially extend the life of the pro-
ject. The proposed change would trigger the Commission pre-approval
process as required by both the Tax Code and Statewide Rule 50.267 In
July 1996, Occidental applied for approval; however, in August, the Rail-
road Commission administratively denied approval. 268 Nevertheless, Oc-
cidental soon began the increased CO 2 injections.269 Although
Occidental could have requested a hearing following the denial of its ap-
plication, it did not do so until July 1998.270 The hearings examiners de-
nied the application because Statewide Rule 50 "clearly requires approval
of an application prior to active operations, '271 and the Commission
adopted the findings and conclusions of the examiners and denied the
application.
Occidental appealed, "asserting that the Commission's order was arbi-
trary, an abuse of discretion, and not supported by [the] evidence. 272
259. Id.
260. 47 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
261. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 202.051 (West 1992) and § 202.052(a) (West Supp.
2001).
262. Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 804 (citing Act of May 24, 1991, 72d Leg.,
R.S., Ch. 604, §§ 1-4, 1991 Tex. Gen. Law 2196, 2196-99 (codified as TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 202.052, .054, since amended)).
263. Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 804 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 202.054(b) (West Supp. 2001)).
264. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.50 (2001).
265. See Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 804 (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.50
(West 2001)); see also Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 804 n.4.
266. Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 804.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 805.
270. Id.




The court affirmed, relying upon the usual rules requiring judicial defer-
ence to administrative decisions.2 73 It found that both the Tax Code and
Statewide Rule 50 are clear, that it was undisputed Occidental began ex-
pansion without Railroad Commission approval, and therefore, there was
a reasonable basis for the Commission's decision. 274
In deciding to proceed with the additional injections, Occidental faced
the practical difficulty that the time required to secure approval was un-
certain. Occidental was rapidly approaching the 50% level, and the effect
of delaying the injections would be lost production and lost reserves. 275
There is no deadline in Statewide Rule 50 regarding the time within
which a hearing must be requested after an administrative denial.276 The
court was unimpressed with Occidental's practical problems and con-
cluded that Occidental could have started the process sooner. Having
failed to do so, Occidental "made a business decision in 1996, that pro-
ceeding with its project without a tax reduction was preferable (and pre-
sumably more profitable) to taking a chance that the project would be
delayed.'"277
X. ENVIRONMENTAL
Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Insurance PLC2 78 is an insur-
ance coverage case triggered by lessors filing suit against Harken for al-
legedly polluting Big Creek Ranch. When its insurers refused to provide
a defense, Harken initiated a declaratory judgment action in state court
to determine whether the insurance companies had a duty to defend.2 79
The coverage issue turned on whether lessors had alleged an "occur-
rence" under the policy.
The lessors alleged "that Harken operated an oil facility on the Ranch
[and] that various lines, tanks, and wells [had] ruptured and overflowed,
releasing pollutants, including saline substances." The damages alleged
included polluted water, dead cattle, and destroyed vegetation.280 The
insurance policies did not define "accident." Applying Texas law, the
court concluded that if the act is deliberately taken, the act is performed
negligently, and the effect is not the intended or expected result had the
deliberate act been performed non-negligently, there is an accident.281
Even though the lessors had alleged that Harken's conduct was malicious,
the court refused to accept the insurer's contention that a malicious act
cannot be negligent.2 82 At least part of the claim was apparently covered,
273. Id. at 813.
274. Id. at 806.
275. Id. at 808.
276. Occidental Permian Ltd., 47 S.W.3d at 808.
277. Id. at 807.
278. 261 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2001).
279. Id. at 469-70.
280. Id. at 473.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 474.
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and "'[i]f an insurer has a duty to defend any portion of a suit, the insurer
must defend the entire suit."' 283
The court also found that the allegations made by the lessors were suf-
ficient to qualify as "sudden," and therefore another possible exclusion to
coverage was inapplicable. 28 4 The court then considered the effect of the
Seepage and Pollution Endorsement (S&P Endorsement) and the Saline
Substances Contamination Hazard Clause (Saline Clause) and held that
the S&P Endorsement and the Saline Clause re-institutes the insurance
companies' duty to indemnify and defend the insured.28 5
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.28 6 holds that the Oil Pollution Act 287
does not extend to subsurface waters and the fact that contaminated
groundwater might contaminate surface waters was insufficient to estab-
lish liability. Rice alleged that Harken discharged oil into or upon "navi-
gable waters" in violation of the OPA.2 88 "The OPA was enacted in 1990
in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
and was intended to streamline federal law so as to provide quick and
efficient cleanup of oil spills, compensate victims of such spills, and inter-
nalize the costs of spills within the petroleum industry. '2 89 The crux of
the OPA is the regulation of facilities which discharge pollutants "into or
upon ... navigable waters. '2 90 "The OPA and its related regulations de-
fine navigable waters to mean 'the waters of the United States, including
the territorial sea."291
Rice owned Big Creek Ranch. Big Creek crossed the ranch, flowed
into the Canadian River, thence to the Arkansas River, thence to the
Mississippi River, and finally discharged into the Gulf of Mexico.2 92 Rice
complained of a number of small spills, which cumulated over time, and
the resulting groundwater contamination. "The exact nature of Big
Creek [was] unclear from the record, [but] Harken did not dispute that
the Canadian River was legally a 'navigable water.' 293 Harken's motion
for summary judgment was granted on grounds that the OPA was not
intended to cover spills of oil onto dry land that occurred hundreds of
miles from any coast or shoreline. '294 The case attracted amicus briefs
from the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources
Division, the State of Texas, the Independent Petroleum Association of
America, Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association,
283. Harken, 261 F.3d at 474 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp.-Texas, 249 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2001)).
284. Id. at 475.
285. Id. at 475-76.
286. 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
287. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (2001) [hereinafter OPA].
288. Rice, 250 F.3d at 265.
289. Id. at 266 (citing Senate Report No. 104-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
723).
290. Rice, 250 F.3d at 266-67.
291. Id. at 267 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21) (2001); 15 C.F.R. § 990.30) (2001).
292. Rice, 250 F.3d at 265.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 266.
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Texas Oil and Gas Association, and North Texas Oil & Gas
Association. 295
The court found that the construction given to "navigable waters" in
connection with the Clean Water Act is controlling, because Congress
plainly intended that "navigable waters" would have the same meaning in
both the OPA and the Clean Water Act.296 The court found that the trial
"court's conclusion that the OPA cannot apply to any inland waters was
erroneous, '297 but nevertheless found that Rice had no claim. Rice
pointed to two categories of waters protected by the OPA-groundwater
and Big Creek surface water.298 The court summarily rejected the claim
as to groundwater, holding that it is well established that groundwater is
not protected by the Clean Water Act, and therefore "waters of the
United States" under the OPA does not include groundwater. 299 As to
Big Creek, the court held that it is not the presence of oil that grants
jurisdiction under the OPA, but a body of water that is protected under
the Act. A body of water is protected under the OPA only if it is actually
navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.300
It was conceded that the Canadian River is a "navigable water" within
the meaning of the OPA, and Rice contended that the pollution of the
subsurface water would eventually reach the Canadian River. The court
also rejected this claim and stated:
So far as here relevant, the "discharges" for which the OPA imposes
liability are those "into or upon the navigable waters." As noted,
"navigable waters" do not include groundwater. It would be an un-
warranted expansion of the OPA to conclude that a discharge onto
dry land, some of which eventually reaches groundwater and some of
the latter of which still later may reach navigable waters, all by grad-
ual, natural seepage, is the equivalent of a "discharge" "into or upon
the navigable waters."' 301
XI. LEGISLATION
A. EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
1. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1233, §§ 1 -
77, 2001 Sess. Law Serv. 2691.302 (S.B. 310)
295. Id. at 264.
296. Id. at 267-68.
297. Rice, 250 F.3d at 269.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 269-70.
300. Id. at 270.
301. Id. at 271.
302. Codified as amendments to TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. arts. 6445a, 6447, 6447b, 6447c,
6447h, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 81.0522(a), 81.0531(c), 81.0531(d), 81.116, 81.117, 85.161,
85.2021, 89.002(2)(a), 89.011, 89.043(c), 89.083(c), 89.085(a), 89.085(g), 89.085(h),
89.086(a), 89.086(c), 91.1013(a), 91.1013(b), 91.104(b), 91.104(c), 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107,
91.108, 91.109, 91.111(b), 91.111(c), 91.112, 113.011, 113.014, 113.015, 113.0511, 113.082,
113.084(b), 113.084(c), 113.087(b), 113.087(c), 113.087(i) - (m), 113.089(a), 113.089(c),
113.090(a), 113.090(b), 113.091(b), 113.091(c), 113.091(d), 113.093, 113.096, 113.097(d),
113.097(h), 113.098(a), 113.098(c), 113.099(a) - (d), 113, subch. F heading, 113.161(e),
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ISSUE: RELATING TO THE CONTINUATION AND FUNCTIONS OF
THE RAILROAD COMMISSION.
SUMMARY: This Act increases the funding for the Oil Field
Cleanup Fund ("OFCF") by increasing the oil-field cleanup regulatory
fees on crude oil by 5/16 cent and on natural gas by 1/30 cent, together
with $100 increases in fees for drilling and workovers of wells, requests to
expedite drilling and workover permits, fluid injection permits, surface
water discharge permits, and rule exceptions, except for well spacing and
density exceptions, which have a $150 increase.
This Act also establishes a new sliding scale filing fee for annual P-5
Organization reports. The filing fee scale ranges from $300 to $1,000. In
addition, there is a new $1,000 application fee for the Voluntary Cleanup
Program.
This Act increases the cost for an annual W-1X plugging extension to
$300 until September 1, 2004, and increases to $1,000 the annual cost for
a "good guy" fee. This "good guy" fee is only applicable if the Railroad
Commission determines that individual and blanket bonds are not obtain-
able at reasonable prices and the applicant meets the "good guy" stan-
dards of compliance. An increase to 12.5% of the bond requirement for
an operator who cannot meet the "good guy" compliance standards is
also imposed. In addition, the fund cap is increased to $20 million, rela-
tive to collection of regulatory fees on oil and gas production.
This Act also provides that the proceeds from bonds and other re-
quired financial securities may be used only for actual well plugging and
surface remediation, and it makes the current bonding amounts applica-
ble only to land well operations. The Railroad Commission is authorized
to set "reasonable" additional bonding requirements for operators of off-
shore and bay wells. In addition, effective September 1, 2004, the W-1X
alternatives for plugging security are eliminated, and instead requires a
Railroad Commission approved bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as
financial security. Effective September 1, 2004, the bonding requirement
for persons involved in activities other than the operation of wells is in-
creased to $250,000; unless, a person demonstrates to the Commission
that a lesser amount is warranted and makes this bonding requirement in
addition to any other required financial security requirement.
113.163, 113.233(b), 113.243(b), 113.243(c), 113.243(d), 116.037, 116.037(f), 116.037(g),
TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 102.001, 103.001, 104.107(b), 121.103(a), 121.2015, 121.206(c), ch. 121,
subch. J heading, 121.501 - 121.506, adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. arts. 6447k, 64471, 6447m,
6447n, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 81.0521(a), 81.0521(c), 81.0531(e), 81.055, 81.056,
91.111(e), 91.1131, 91.1132, 91.1135, 91.142(g), 91.651, 91.652, 91.653, 91.654, 91.655,
91.656, 91.657, 91.658, 91.659, 91.660, 91.661, 113.087(n), 113.087(o), 113.243(f), 113.243(g),
ch. 113, subch J and K headings, 113.351, 113.352, 113.353, 113.354, 113.355, 113.356,
113.357, 116.016, 116.033, 116.034(d) - (k), 116.0345, 116.0346, 116.037(h), 117.012(h) - (k),
118.001, 118.002, 118.003, 118.004, 118.005, TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 102.006, 103.003,
104.107(c), 104.2551, 121.103(d), 121.206(d), 121.5005, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 2003.0491, and




. Effective immediately, any well transferred, sold, or assigned to an-
other party by its operator must be bonded in accordance with the stat-
utes then in effect before the Railroad Commission approves the transfer
of ownership. A transfer of a well from one entity to another entity
under common ownership is a "transfer" which requires bonding.
This Act requires the Railroad Commission, through the legislative ap-
propriations process, to establish specific performance goals for the
OFCF for the next biennium. Goals for the number of site investigations,
environmental assessments, well pluggings, and surface location remedia-
tions must also be made. In addition, the Railroad Commission's annual
OFCF report to the legislature must include performance statistics by re-
gion together with a detailed accounting of expenditures.
This Act also establishes a ten member OFCF Advisory Committee, to
be composed of the executive officer, or designee, of each of the five
Texas Oil and Gas Associations, the chairs of the Senate Natural Re-
sources and House Energy Resources Committees, a public member ap-
pointed by the Governor, one member appointed by Speaker of the
House, and one member appointed by the Lieutenant Governor. The
latter two members must be from the academic fields of geology or eco-
nomics. The Committee must meet at least quarterly with the Railroad
Commission to receive information about proposed rules relating to the
OFCF, review recommendations for Railroad Commission proposed leg-
islation, and monitor OFCF effectiveness. The Committee must report to
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House an
analysis of any administration problems of the OFCF and any recommen-
dations for legislation needed to further the OFCF's purpose. This report
must be given on or before November 15 of each year preceding a regular
legislative session.
This Act also requires the Railroad Commission to develop a system
for identifying abandoned wells that pose a high risk of contaminating
surface water or groundwater. It also authorizes the Commission to
adopt rules establishing risk assessment as the guide for conducting site
investigations and environmental assessments and for controlling and
cleaning up oil and gas wastes. The Act provides general provisions which
are to be included in any such rules.
This Act mandates that an operator, when plugging a well where usea-
ble quality water zones are present, verify that the placement of the plug
is at the base of the deepest fresh water zone required to be protected. If
the operator plugs the well back to produced fresh water, the operator's
duty to properly plug the well ends only when the well has been properly
plugged in accordance with the Railroad Commission's requirements and,
if applicable, the surface owner has obtained a permit for the well from
the groundwater conservation district.
This Act also creates the Railroad Commission Voluntary Cleanup
Fund (VCP), and authorizes the OFCF to be used for implementing the
VCP. The purpose of the VCP is to provide incentives to lenders, devel-
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opers, owners and operators who did not cause or contribute to contami-
nation at an oil-field site to remediate the problem. The VCP does this
by releasing a person who is certified by the Railroad Commission as
having completed such remediation from all liability to the state for fu-
ture site cleanup other than that caused or contributed to by that person.
The surface owner of a particular oil-field site must give written authori-
zation agreeing to an applicant's participation in the program. A formal
agreement, setting forth the terms and conditions for the Railroad Com-
mission's evaluation of the proposed remediation goals, methods used for
the remediation, and the implementation of work plans, is required, and
the applicant must pay all costs attributable to the Commission's over-
sight of the voluntary cleanup.
This Act authorizes the legislature to study, not later than March 1,
2002, the desirability of requiring an owner, operator, or manager of a
pipeline system to obtain liability insurance coverage, a bond, or some
other evidence of financial responsibility in order to protect the public
from the costs resulting from a discharge of the pipeline system and to
make its report available to the public. Should the legislature find that
the adoption of such a requirement is desirable, the Railroad Commission
is authorized to require an owner, operator, or manager of a pipeline
system to obtain evidence of financial responsibility. The evidence of fi-
nancial responsibility may be in different amounts for different pipeline
systems, considering the age of the pipeline system and the location of the
pipelines.
This Act also requires that a notice of pipeline construction be pub-
lished at least 30 days before the start of construction for a new pipeline
system, or for the extension of an existing pipeline system, that crosses
more than three counties and for which construction begins after Septem-
ber 1, 2001. The Railroad Commission has a duty to certify, before issu-
ing a permit for the operation of such a pipeline, that a copy of the
application has been given at least ninety days earlier to each county
judge, county fire marshal, and regional water planning group whose re-
spective jurisdictions contain part of the proposed pipeline route.
This Act provides that pipeline operator liaison meetings with fire, po-
lice and other appropriate public officials in preparation for possible
emergency response to a pipeline accident are to be conducted in person,
if possible. If the pipeline operator cannot arrange for a meeting in per-
son, the operator must make specified efforts to conduct community liai-
son meetings by means of a telephone conference call. If the operator
cannot arrange for a meeting in person or a telephone conference call,
the operator may deliver the necessary information by certified mail, re-
turn receipt requested, to the appropriate officials. In addition, the oper-
ator or owner of each inter- or intrastate hazardous liquid or carbon
dioxide pipeline facility that is located within 1,000 feet of a public school
is required to develop an emergency response plan in consultation with
the local fire department or another local emergency response entity.
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Such a plan must be presented to the board of trustees of the school
district.
This Act also authorizes the Railroad Commission to adopt rules re-
quiring an operator to file a plan of assessment or testing of a pipeline for
approval if the Commission believes that the pipeline may present a haz-
ard to public health or safety, or if the Commission lacks adequate infor-
mation to assess the risk to public health and safety. The Commission
may specify to which pipelines under their jurisdiction such requirements
are applicable. However, it is expressly stipulated that Commission ap-
proval of such a plan does not constitute certification or representation
that the pipeline is in compliance with or exempt from the applicable
safety standards. The Commission is directed to adopt regulatory guide-
lines to be used in determining the amount of a penalty for a violation of
their pipeline safety regulations. The Act provides that the guidelines
shall include a penalty calculation worksheet that specifies the typical
penalty for certain violations, along with a listing of circumstances which
would justify an enhancement or reduction in the penalty and the amount
of such a change.
This Act also requires the utility division of the State Office of Admin-
istrative Hearings (SOAH) to conduct each hearing in a contested gas
utilities rate case that is not conducted by one or more members of the
Railroad Commission. The Commission is allowed to delegate to the
SOAH the authority to make a final decision and to issue findings of
facts, conclusions of law, and other necessary orders in a proceeding in
which there is not a contested issue of fact or law.
This Act also authorizes the Railroad Commission to increase the fee
for a Natural Gas Policy Act well category determination to $150.
EFFECrIVE: September 1, 2001, except for provisions noted in
summary.
2. ACT: Act of June 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 824, §§ 1 - 4,
2001 Leg. Sess. Law Serv. 1549.303 (H.B. 981)
ISSUE: RELATING TO OIL AND GAS REPORTING STANDARDS.
SUMMARY: This Act requires that a property name, county, and
state be included on the check stub in addition to the items already re-
quired by statute. A telephone number where the royalty owner can con-
tact the company to inquire about payment questions is also required to
be on the check stub. Inquiries about certain types of check stub infor-
mation, such as property descriptions, details about deductions or adjust-
ments, heating value of the gas, or a report of associated Railroad
Commission numbers, can be done by certified mail, and must be handled
within 60 days of receipt. The payor must also send a notice once a year
to the royalty owners it is paying and advise them that the owner may
request additional information and how to obtain production information
303. Codified as TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.5001, amending §§ 91.501 - 91.506, and
adding § 91.507 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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from the Railroad Commission. Payors who fail to timely respond to
such a request by certified mail may be subject to a lawsuit or voluntary
mediation, where the loser must pay reasonable court costs and attorney
fees.
EFFECTIVE: January 1, 2002, except for the check stub information,
which takes effect September 1, 2002.
3. ACT: Act of June 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 858, §§ 1-3,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1609.304 (H.B. 1669)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE DUTY OF AN OPERATOR OF AN
UNDERGROUND FACILITY TO NOTIFY AN EXCAVATOR
OF THE OPERATOR'S INTENTIONS.
SUMMARY: This Act requires the operator of an underground fa-
cility contacted by a one-call center to notify the excavator within 48
hours of the time the excavator gave notice of intent to excavate, if the
operator does not plan to mark the proximate location of an underground
facility at or near the site of the proposed excavation. The notice to the
excavator must be given by e-mail or by facsimile or by another verifiable
and approved electronic method.
EFFECTIVE: November 1, 2001.
4. ACT: Act of June 13, 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 652, §§ 1-4, 2001
Sess. Law. Serv. 1149.305 (H.B. 2391)
ISSUE: RELATING TO FEES AND PENALTIES RELATING TO
NOTIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND EXCAVATION.
SUMMARY: This Act provides for a ten-fold increase in the mini-
mum and maximum financial penalties for excavator violations of the
Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety Act. 30 6 In lieu of a
civil penalty, the county or district attorney may give a violator a warning
letter and require attendance at a Texas Underground Facility Notifica-
tion Center (TUFNC). In addition, this Act increases from one cent to
five cents the TUFNC fee for each excavator call to a one-call center and
requires the TUFNC to waive the fee for the remainder of any year in
which the corporation receives $250,000.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
5. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1200, §§ 1 - 3,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 2576.307 (H.B. 3587)
ISSUE: RELATING TO GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIS-
TRICTS.
304. Codified as an amendment to TEX. UTIL. CODE § 251.152, and adding § 251.157(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
305. Codified as an amendment to TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 251.106, 251.201, and adding
§ 251.2011 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
306. TEX. UTIL. CODE § 251.001 et seq.
307. Codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE § 36.117 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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SUMMARY: This Act modifies exemptions, exceptions, and limita-
tions on water well permitting requirements for groundwater conserva-
tion districts in three ways. First, this Act changes the exemption for
hydrocarbon production activities to include only a well used to supply
water solely for a drilling rig which is actively engaged in drilling or ex-
ploration operations for a well permitted by the Railroad Commission,
provided that the person holding the permit is responsible for the water
well and that the well is located on the lease. Furthermore, a district may
not deny an application for a permit to drill and produce water for hydro-
carbon production activities if the application is in compliance with the
spacing, density, and production rules of the district. Second, this Act
provides that a district may require a well used for drilling rig water sup-
ply or mining purposes be permitted if the well is no longer used for those
purposes. And, third, this Act provides that an exemption in the Act
does not affect a district's authority either to impose fees regarding the
transfer of groundwater out of the district or to levy taxes or collect fees.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
6. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, §§ 1 - 13,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1880.308 (S.B. 2)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE STATE.
SUMMARY: This Act clarifies that ownership of and rights to
groundwater by landowners and their lessees and assigns may be limited
or altered by rules promulgated by a Groundwater Conservation District
(GCD).
Specifically, this Act provides that a GCD may impose more restrictive
permit conditions on new water well permit applications and increased
use by historic users if three conditions are met. First, the limitations must
apply to all subsequent new permit applications and increased use by his-
toric users, regardless of type or location of use. Second, the limitations
bear a reasonable relationship to the existing district management plan.
Third, the limitations are reasonably necessary to protect an existing use.
This Act also authorizes a GCD to regulate water well spacing and to
limit production. This authority is granted to minimize the drawdown of
308. Codified as TEX. WATER CODE §§ 9.001 - 9.017, 11.002(11) - (14), 26.050, and
amending TEX. WATER CODE §§ 11.023(a), 11.024, 11.122(a), 11.134(b), 11.142, 16.053(d),
16.053(e), 16.054(a), 16.504(c), 16.504(d), 35.002(11), 35.004, 35.007(a), 35.007(f), 35.008,
35.009(a), 35.009(b), 35.012, 35.013, 35.018(c), 36.001(13), 36.0015, 36.002, 36.011(b),
36.013, 36.01436.015, 36.0151(a), 36.016(a), 36.017(a), 36.017(d), 36.017(g), 36.019,
36.060(a), 36.066(g), 36.101(a), 36.102(b), 36.1071(a), 36.1071(b), 36.108, 36.113(d), 36.116,
36.117, 36.122, 36.205, 36.206(b), 36.303(a), 51.149, 26.0286, 13.137, 13.144, 13.183(c),
13.187, 26.359, 36.121, TEX. TAX CODE § 11.32, TEX. UTIL. CODE § 182.052(a), and adding
TEX. WATER CODE §§ 13.2541, 13.145, 13.183(d), 13.183(e), 13.343, 15.602(8), 17.8955,
17.9615, 17.9616, 26.117(h), 27.051(h), 36.001(18) - (22), 36.012(f), 36.017(i), 36.0171,
36.1071(h), 36.1072(g), 36.113(e), 36.206(c), 36.3011, 36.3035, TEX. TAX CODE § 151.355,
and relettering TEX. WATER CODE §§ 36.113(e) and (f) to (f) and (g), and redesignating
the existing TEX. WATER CODE §§ 15.602(8) - (14) to 15.602(9) - (15), and repealing TEX.
WATER CODE §§ 35.005, 35.006 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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the water table, or to minimize the reduction of artesian pressure, as well
as to control subsidence and interference between wells, to protect
against the degradation of water quality, and to prevent waste. The dis-
trict may preserve historic use before the effective date of the rules to the
maximum extent practicable so long as doing so would be consistent with
the district's comprehensive management plan.
Much like H.B. 3587,309 this Act provides that a GCD may not deny an
application for a permit to drill and produce water for hydrocarbon pro-
duction activities if the application is in compliance with the applicable
district rules. Also, the GCD may not require a permit for drilling a water
well used solely to supply water for a drilling rig that is actively engaged
in drilling or exploration operations for a Railroad Commission-permit-
ted oil or gas well, provided that the person holding the Railroad Com-
mission permit is responsible for drilling and operating the water well and
that the water well is located on the same lease or field associated with
the drilling rig. However, a GCD may require that such a well be permit-
ted by the district if the well is no longer used solely for the purposes
specified. Furthermore, a water well exempted from getting a permit
must be registered, and a drilling log filed, with the GCD.
This Act also authorizes a GCD, provided it is not a GCD that collects
a property tax and was created before September 1, 1999, to assess, and
use for any lawful purpose, production fees in lieu of or in conjunction
with any taxes otherwise levied by the district. The fees may be based on
either the amount of water authorized by permit to be withdrawn from a
well or the amount actually withdrawn. With respect to the latter, pro-
duction fees are capped at $1 per acre-foot, payable annually, for water
used for agricultural purposes and at $10 per acre-foot, payable annually,
for water used for any other purpose. The GCD is also authorized to
assess a production fee for water produced under an exemption if such
water is later sold to another person or transported outside the bounda-
ries of the district.
This Act also provides that the fee assessed by the GCD for a permit
for the transfer of groundwater outside of the district may not exceed the
fees that the GCD imposes for processing other permit applications.
Nevertheless, the GCD may assess a reasonable export fee, which may be
(1) negotiated between the district and the transporter of the water; (2) a
rate not to exceed the district's tax rate per hundred dollars of valuation,
with a minimum of 2.5 cents for each thousand gallons of water trans-
ferred out of the district; or (3) for those districts which are fee-based, a
50 percent export surcharge in addition to the district's production fee.
EFFECtiVE: September 1, 2001.
309. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
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7. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1227, §§ 1 -
14, 2001 Sess. Law Serv. 2656.310 (S.B. 220)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF WEIGHT LIMITATIONS AND SAFETY STANDARDS
FOR CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES.
SUMMARY: This Act amends the Transportation Code to clarify
weight tolerances for specific vehicles and to restrict vehicles that are op-
erating under a special tolerance permit from operating on a bridge for
which maximum weight and load limits have been established by the
Texas Transportation Commission or by a county commissioners court, if
the gross weight of the vehicle and load or if the axles and wheel loads
are greater than the established and posted limits. However, this restric-
tion does not apply if the bridge is along the only public highway or road
that the permitted vehicle can use to travel from its point of origin to its
destination. In addition, this Act establishes that those persons operating
certain vehicles who fail to keep a weight record are guilty of committing
a Class C misdemeanor.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
8. ACT: Act of May 11, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 99, §§ 1 - 3,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 179.311 (S.B. 405)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL
GEOSCI ENTISTS.
SUMMARY: This Act establishes the Geoscience Practice Act and
the Texas Board of Professional Geoscientists. The Board is charged with
the responsibility of administering licenses, certificates, seals and gener-
ally regulating the public practice of geology, geophysics, soil science, and
various specialties within those fields. The Act provides an exemption for
"geoscientific work performed exclusively for and developing oil, gas, or
other energy resources ... if the work is done in and for the benefit of
private industry. ' 312
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001, except for the licensing require-
ments and the administrative penalties for violating
the Act, which go into effect on September 1, 2003.
9. ACT: Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 276, §§ 1-2,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 498.313 (S.B. 1338)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE RAILROAD
COMMISSION TO REGULATE OIL AND GAS NORM
WASTE.
310. Codified as an amendment to TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 251.153(a), 621.101,
621.301(a), 623.011(c), and adding §§ 261.001(10), 261.001(11), 621.007, 621.410, 621.509,
623.0113, 644.005 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
311. Codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 3271(b), and as an amendment to TEX. Lo-
CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 212.0101(a), 232.0031(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
312. Id. at § 6.02(3).
313. Codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 401.415 (Vernon
Supp. 2001).
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SUMMARY: This Act authorizes the Railroad Commission to re-
quire owners and operators of oil and gas equipment to determine
whether the equipment contains or is contaminated with oil and gas
NORM waste and to identify any such equipment found.
EFFECTIVE: May 22, 2001.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL
1. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 965, §§ 1 - 20,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1825. 3 14 (H.B. 2912)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE CONTINUATION AND FUNCTIONS OF
THE TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION
COMMISSION.
SUMMARY: This Act renames the Texas Natural Resource Conser-
vation Commission to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality,
effective January 1, 2004. In addition, this Act creates or modifies current
environmental issues in numerous ways.
First, while not creating an independent Office of Public Interest Coun-
cil, this Act authorizes the TNRCC's Public Interest Council to recom-
mend needed legislative and regulatory changes and creates a Joint
Interim Study to address issues related to creating an independent Public
Interest Council office. One specific issue to be addressed involves study-
ing the authority to appeal decisions of the TNRCC by the Public Interest
Council.
Second, this Act requires the owner or operator of a facility that exper-
iences emissions events-defined as upsets or unscheduled maintenance,
startup, or shutdown activities that result in unauthorized emissions of air
contaminants-to maintain a record of all such events at the facility and
to notify the commission, as soon as practicable but not later than 24
hours after discovery, when such an event exceeding a reportable quan-
tity occurs. The owner or operator is also directed to report specific in-
formation to TNRCC within two weeks of an reportable quantity release
so that the TNRCC may evaluate the emissions event.
Third, this Act separates Texas into East Texas and West Texas, with
the dividing line being all counties traversed by or east of Interstate High-
way 35 north of San Antonio or Interstate Highway 37 south of San
Antonio and grandfathered facilities in the East Texas region must sub-
mit a permit application or a notice of shutdown by September 1, 2003,
314. Codified as TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.056(r), amending TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 361.0231(a), 382.051(a), 382.051(b), 382.05191, 382.0592, 366.076,
361.114, 382.019(a), 382.037(g), 382.039(a), 366.0512, TEX. WATER CODE §§ 5.107, 5.176,
5.177, 5.178(b), 5.228, 27.003, 26.0291, 26.0135(h), 7.031(c), 26.342(9) - (17), 26.028(d),
26.040(h), 27.051(d), 27.051(e), adding TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 366.059(d),
361.088, 382.0215, 382.0216, 382.05181 - 382.05186, 382.065, 361.1875, 382.037(h),
382.037(i), TEX. WATER CODE §§ 5.103(d), 5.5145, 5.702 - 5.708, 5.127 - 5.131, 5.1733,
5.1765, 5.1771, 5.1772, 5.1773, 7.0025, 7.031(f), 26.3571(g), 26.3571(h), 26.3573(r),
26.3573(s), 27.051(h), transferring and amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6243-101 to
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 341.101 - 341.105 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
2002] 1261
SMU LAW REVIEW
and to fully comply with the resultant permit conditions by September 1,
2007, or it must cease operations. West Texas must do the same, but has
until September 1, 2004, and September 1, 2008, to do so.
Fourth, this Act provides that grandfather reciprocating internal com-
bustion engines that are part of a processing, treating, compressing or
pumping facility connected to or part of a gathering or transmission pipe-
line may be permitted under a single permit. For the East Texas regions,
a 50% reduction in the hourly emission rate of nitrogen oxides and up to
a 50% reduction in the hourly emission rate of volatile organic com-
pounds, each expressed in terms of grams per brake horsepower, is re-
quired. For the West Texas region, the TNRCC is allowed to require up
to a 20% reduction of both compounds.
Fifth, this Act creates a comprehensive performance-based regulation
program applicable to TNRCC permitting and enforcement programs
and authorizes innovative programs which provide incentives for benefits
to the environment that exceed the benefits that would result from com-
pliance with applicable legal requirements under the commission's juris-
diction, including the flexible permit program for air permits and the
general regulatory flexibility program.
Sixth, this Act prohibits the TNRCC from establishing standards re-
garding motor vehicle fuels that are more stringent or restrictive than
those imposed by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency
for the same area of the state before January 1, 2004, except for Texas
low-emission diesel, which may not be required before February 1, 2005.
In addition, this Act authorizes the TNRCC to consider alternative fuels
to achieve equivalent emissions reductions.
Seventh, this Act amends section 5.103 of the Water Code to clarify the
TNRCC's general jurisdiction and to specify that it does not delegate leg-
islative authority.
Eighth, this Act requires the TNRCC to include, as part of each rule
proposed and adopted, a citation to the specific statutory authority justi-
fying the proposed or adopted rule. If a rule is adopted without such a
citation, the rule is void.
Ninth, this Act requires the TNRCC to make reasonable attempts to
have a balanced representation on all advisory committees, work groups,
and task forces; however, a rule or other action may not be challenged
because of the composition of an advisory committee, work group or task
force. The TNRCC is required to maintain information on the composi-
tion and activities of such groups in both a form and a location that is
easily accessible to the public.
Tenth, this Act places requirements on the data and analysis used in
Commission decisions relating to the permits or other authorizations and
actions, such as compliance matters, enforcement actions or corrective
actions. The Act does this by requiring the TNRCC to accept environ-
mental testing laboratory data and analyses only from TNRCC or feder-
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ally accredited laboratories or from TNRCC inspected onsite or in-house
laboratories.
Eleventh, this Act directs the TNRCC to encourage the use of elec-
tronic reporting for reports required by the commission and to strive to
reduce duplication in reporting requirements throughout the agency.
Twelfth, this Act requires a succinct summary statement for each public
notice issued or published by the commission or by a person under the
jurisdiction of the commission. The summary statement must be designed
to inform the reader of the subject matter of a notice without requiring
him to read the entire text of the notice. However, the summary state-
ment may not be used as a grounds by which the validity of the action
proposed in the notice may be challenged.
Thirteenth, this Act directs the TNRCC to develop and implement pol-
icies which will protect the public from cumulative risks in areas where
there are concentrated operators. In formulating such policies, the
TNRCC is directed to give priority to monitoring and enforcement in
areas where regulated facilities are concentrated.
Fourteenth, this Act requires the TNRCC to adopt regulatory incen-
tives in order to encourage the use or environmental management sys-
tems (EMS) by regulated entities, local and state agencies, and local
governmental bodies. Such EMS incentives may include on-site technical
assistance, accelerated access to information about TNRCC programs,
the inclusion of information regarding the use of an EMS in an entity's
compliance history and summaries, and consideration of EMS implemen-
tation in the scheduling and conducting of compliance inspections.
Fifteenth, this Act requires the TNRCC to post public information, in-
cluding pending permit and enforcement actions, compliance histories,
and emissions inventories, by county and facility name on its website.
Sixteenth, this Act requires the Commission to establish and publish
information relating to the process used for educating the public regard-
ing TNRCC's complaint policies and procedures. The TNRCC is also
directed to develop procedures in order to timely respond to complaints
made outside of regular business hours. However, in formulating such
procedures, this Act does not authorize any additional use of overtime.
In addition, this Act requires a comprehensive analysis of complaints re-
ceived by the TNRCC.
Seventeenth, this Act requires that the executive director (E.D.) be
named a party in TNRCC hearings in matters in which the E.D. bears the
burden of proof. During a contested case hearing relating to a permit
application, the E.D. is prohibited from rehabilitating the testimony of a
witness, other than a TNRCC employee, and is prohibited from assisting
a permit applicant in meeting its burden of proof during such a hearing.
This Act does, however, require the TNRCC to establish categories of
permit applicants who are exempt from this general prohibition and are
thus eligible to receive such assistance. This Act also provides that the
E.D. may nevertheless participate as a party in contested case permit
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hearings for the sole purpose of providing information to complete the
administrative record. Before participating as a party, the E.D. must con-
sider certain factors, specified in rules to be adopted by the TNRCC, in
determining, case by case, whether to participate as a party in a contested
case permit hearing.
Eighteenth, this Act requires that a draft permit, which is being
presented to the Commission for action, include a summary of changes to
the applicant's proposal as required by the E.D. in order to increase pro-
tection of the public health and the environment.
Nineteenth, this Act authorizes the TNRCC to initiate an enforcement
action that is based upon information it receives from a private individ-
ual, provided that the information is of sufficient value and credibility to
warrant the initiation of an enforcement action.
Twentieth, this Act authorizes the TNRCC to take into consideration
the economic development of the state in its decisions and actions.
Twenty-first, this Act prohibits the storage, processing, or disposal of
hazardous waste in a solution-mined salt dome cavern or in a sulphur
mine.
Twenty-second, this Act prohibits the Commission from naming a per-
son as a responsible party in a remediation project if the Commission
finds that the contaminants appear to originate from an off-site source,
that additional action is not required at the site, and that the TNRCC will
not undertake formal enforcement.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001, except as noted in the summary.
2. ACT: Act of June 16, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1327, §§ 1 - 5,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 3097. 315 (H.B. 2518)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS FOR THE
EMISSION OF AIR CONTAMINANTS.
SUMMARY: This Act provides that air emissions construction per-
mit amendments, which will result in de minimus emission increases with
no changes in the character of the emissions, are not subject to public
notice requirements. In addition, this Act requires that the commission,
in considering a permit amendment under this section, consider any adju-
dicated decision or compliance proceeding relating to the applicant's
compliance with air emissions laws and regulations within the five years
before the date on which the application was filed.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
3. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1135, §§ 1 -
12, 2001 Sess. Law Serv. 2389.316 (H.B. 2687)
315. Codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 382.0516,
382.0518(a), 382.0518(b), 382.0518(c), 382.0518(d), 382.0518(e), 382.056(a), 382.056(g), and
adding § 382.0518(h) (Vernon's Supp. 2001).
316. Codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE §§ 26.342(9) - (17), 26.346(a),
26.346 (c), 26.3512(b), 26.355(d), 26.3571(b), 26.3572(b), 26.3573(d), 26.3574(b), 26.3574(x),
26.3574(y), 26.3574(z), 26.3574(aa), 26.361, adding § 26.342(18), 26.351(f), 26.351(g),
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ISSUE: RELATING TO THE PROGRAM OF REGULATION AND
REMEDIATION OF UNDERGROUND AND ABOVE-
GROUND STORAGE TANKS.
SUMMARY: This Act extends the life of the groundwater protection
cleanup program for petroleum storage tank remediation until Septem-
ber 1, 2006, reduces by one-third the delivery fees for users of certain
petroleum products, and deletes the fund cap of $100 million. In addi-
tion, this Act requires a person who has reported a release to TNRCC on
or before December 22, 1998, and who is performing corrective action
under this program, to meet certain deadlines while detailing conse-
quences for failure to meet these deadlines.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
4. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1158, §§ 1 -
105, 2001 Sess. Law Serv. 2431.317 (H.B. 2914)
ISSUE: RELATING TO STATE FISCAL MATTERS.
SUMMARY: This Act authorizes the TNRCC to adopt a reimburse-
ment program for emissions reductions from grandfathered reciprocating
internal combustion engines associated with pipelines in the East Texas
region. The reimbursement amount is equal to up to 50% of the capital
costs, excluding interest, required to achieve a 50% emissions reduction
minus the amount that it costs to achieve a 30% emissions reduction.
However, the possible reimbursement amount is capped at $100,000 for
each emission reduction project and $250,000 for any person. In addition,
in order to be eligible for reimbursement under this program, the appli-
cant facility must be reducing its hourly emissions rate of nitrogen oxides
by at least 50%. The Comptroller is directed to establish the Emissions
Reduction Incentives Account, which is to consist of gifts and other
sources designated by the legislature. The TNRCC is authorized to use up
to $16,200,000, plus any interest, from donations to this fund for reim-
bursement of certain grandfathered pipeline facility engine emission re-
ductions. The emissions reduction project must be initiated before March
1, 2006, and completed before March 1, 2007. The TNRCC may not
make any reimbursements before the project is complete, and no reim-
bursements will be made after March 1, 2007.
However, this Act provides that reimbursements will not be made
when a portion of the reductions generated are used to offset the emis-
sions reductions required to be made at another facility, or where the
reductions to be made are required by another federal or state law, regu-
lation, permit, or order.
Furthermore, this Act provides that the reimbursement program does
not affect the responsibility or liability of grandfathered facility owners or
26.351(h), 26 .3571(g), 26.3571(h), 26.3573(r), 26.3573(s), and repealing § 26.361(b) (Vernon
Supp. 2001).
317. Codified as TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.051865 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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operators to reduce emissions under this chapter or any other TNRCC
rule, permit, or order.
In addition, this Act provides that gifts or contributions by an electric
utility or an affiliated power generating company to a program imple-
mented under this section shall be considered as a tangible or intangible
capital cost to improve air quality which is deemed to have occurred
before January 1, 2002, and it shall be included in the electric utility's
generation-related invested capital. Furthermore, such gifts or contribu-
tions shall be deemed to be a legitimate and necessary cost to offset the
emission of airborne contaminants from electric generating facilities.
EFFECTIVE: June 15, 2001.
5. ACT: Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 967, §§ 1 - 22,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1970.318 (S.B. 5)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE TEXAS EMISSIONS REDUCTION
PLAN.
SUMMARY: This Act requires the TNRCC, PUC, Comptroller, and
the new 15 member Texas Council on Environmental Technology
(TCET) to establish and implement the "Texas Emissions Reduction
Plan," (Plan) and creates the "Texas Emissions Reduction Plan Fund" to
pay for the Plan. The Plan and other provisions in this Act are directed at
achieving emission reductions, primarily nitrogen oxides, from mobile
sources and other specified sources such as air conditioners, heaters, and
water heaters, but not from point sources.
This Act requires the TNRCC, the comptroller, and the council to pro-
vide grants or funding under the Plan for the following: 1) the diesel
emissions reduction incentive program, including a purchase or lease in-
centive program for new on-road diesels; 2) the motor vehicle purchase
or lease incentive program for new light duty vehicles; and 3) the new
technology research and development program, under which the TCET is
to identify, evaluate, and deploy new technologies and assist the TNRCC
and the EPA in the process of ensuring credit for technological
advancements.
This Act also requires the PUC to provide grants or funding for the
energy efficiency grant program to increase the retirement, replacement,
and recycling of materials and appliances that contribute to peak energy
demand. These programs are sunsetted on August 31, 2008.
This Act also requires the adoption and enforcement of Texas Building
Energy Performance Standards for both residential and commercial/in-
dustrial buildings by municipalities.
This Act also requires the TNRCC to take all appropriate and neces-
sary actions in order for the EPA to credit the emissions reductions
318. Codified as TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 386.001 - 386.252, 387.001 - 387.010,
388.001 - 388.008, 389.001 - 389.002, amending TEX. TAX CODE §§ 151.0515, 153.203, and
adding TEX. TAX CODE § 152.0215, TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 224.153(c), 341.073(d),
502.1675, 502.186, 548.256(c), 548.256(d), 548.5055 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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achieved under the Plan and the Texas building energy performance stan-
dards to appropriate emissions reduction objectives in the state imple-
mentation plan.
This Act also provides for funding, through fees, of the Plan. The fees
include: 1) a 10% surcharge on the registration of a truck-tractor or com-
mercial motor vehicle; 2) a $10 surcharge on the annual inspection of a
commercial vehicle; 3) a $225 initial vehicle inspection fee for a vehicle
brought into Texas, unless owned by a person in the armed forces of the
United States; 4) a 1% surcharge on the retail sale, lease, or rental, of
new or used equipment; and 5) a 2.5% surcharge on every retail sale or
lease of any model year 1996 or earlier on-road diesel motor vehicle over
14,000 pounds.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
6. ACT: Act of June 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1483, §§ 1 - 2,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 4972. 319 (S.B. 356)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR
INNOVATIVE REGULATORY PROGRAMS IMPLEMENTED
BY THE NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COM-
MISSION.
SUMMARY: This Act requires the TNRCC to work with the Legis-
lative Budget Board to create performance measures that assess the im-
provements in environmental quality achieved by innovative regulatory
programs implemented by the commission.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
7. ACT: Act of June 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 934, §§ 1 - 4,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1766.320 (S.B. 687)
ISSUE: RELATING TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR THE INTEN-
TIONAL OR KNOWING DISCHARGE OF WASTE OR POL-
LUTANTS.
SUMMARY: This Act increases from one year to five years the con-
finement period penalty for the offense of knowingly discharging, includ-
ing discharging from a point source, a waste or pollutant into or adjacent
to water in the state.
EFFECTIVE: June 14, 2001.
C. TAXES
1. ACT: Act of May 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 117, §§ 1 - 2,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 215.321 (H.B. 1100)
319. Codified as TEX. WATER CODE § 5.127 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
320. Codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE §§ 7.145(a), 7.145(b), and re-
pealing TEX. WATER CODE § 7.146 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
321. Codified as TEX. TAX CODE §§ 21.031(g), 21.031(h), and amending TEX. TAX
CODE § 21.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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ISSUE: RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT CERTAIN VES-
SELS AND OTHER WATERCRAFT ARE LOCATED IN THIS
STATE ONLY TEMPORARILY FOR AD VALOREM PUR-
POSES.
SUMMARY: This Act provides for an ad valorem property tax ex-
emption for special purpose vessels under construction, such as off-shore
drilling vessels, as well as vessels to be used in interstate commerce. This
Act also provides for a tangible personal property exemption for such
property intended to be incorporated into such a vessel.
EFFECTIVE: January 1, 2002.
2. ACT: Act of June 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1444, §§ 1 -3,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 4860.322 (H.B. 1241)
ISSUE: RELATING TO THE PURCHASE OF DIESEL FUEL BY CER-
TAIN PERSONS USING A SIGNED STATEMENT.
SUMMARY: This Act provides for a motor fuels tax exemption for
the first sale or use of diesel if it will be consumed by the purchaser in oil
and gas production. The exemption amount is up to 7,400 gallons in a
single transaction and up to a total of 25,000 gallons per month.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
3. ACT: Act of June 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 881, §§ 1 - 2,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 1673.323 (H.B. 3121)
ISSUE: RELATING TO EXEMPTIONS FROM AD VALOREM TAXA-
TION FOR PROPERTY USED TO CONTROL POLLUTION.
SUMMARY: This Act requires the TNRCC to establish, by rule,
specific standards by which applications for the determination of whether
property is used for pollution control to ensure that property used for the
production of goods and services not be exempt. This Act also requires
the TNRCC to advise an applicant and the appropriate appraisal district
of the agency's determination of whether a facility, device, or method is
used wholly or partly to control pollution, and if applicable, the propor-
tion of the property that is pollution control property. The person seek-
ing the exemption or the chief appraiser, within 20 days of receipt of the
notice, is authorized to appeal the executive director's determination to
the commission.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2001.
4. ACT: Act of May 3, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 41, §§ 1 - 3,
2001 Sess. Law Serv. 68.324 (S.B. 640)
322. Codified as TEX. TAX CODE §153.001(37), and amending TEX. TAX CODE
§§ 153.205(a), 153.205(b), 153.205(i), 153.209(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
323. Codified as TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.31(h) - (j), and amending TEX. TAX CODE
§§ 11.31(d) - (g) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
324. Codified as TEX. TAX CODE §§ 111.0625, 111.0626, and amending TEX. TAX CODE
§ 111.063 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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ISSUE: RELATING TO ELECTRONIC FILING OF CERTAIN TAX
REPORTS AND PAYMENTS.
SUMMARY: This Act requires taxpayers owing more than $100,000
in annual taxes to make payments via electronic funds transfer and pro-
vides an option for any taxpayer owing less than $100,000 in annual taxes
to pay via electronic funds transfer. In addition, this Act requires elec-
tronic filing of the tax data reports required under the oil production tax,
the natural gas production tax, the sales and use tax, and the international
fuels tax agreements.
EFFECTIVE: May 3, 2001.
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